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Introduction 
Introduction 
The choice of the subject of this Master’s thesis is primarily driven by the author’s long-
standing interest in innovative ideas and their realizations. Innovation in all spheres of human 
activity, in author’s opinion, is the critical process that helps the humankind to constantly 
improve its general welfare. Innovation expresses itself most evidently in technical progress, 
which is creating previously unseen opportunities for enhancing the wellbeing of societies. 
During the past century, in particular, substantial economic gains from advances in natural 
science, management and information technology, among others, have been realized and 
continue to accrue. 
Although much less obvious to many, the field of finance is making an important contribution 
to economic progress as well. Theoretical breakthroughs achieved in the second half of the 
twentieth century by academics of the field provided a new foundation for financial decisions, 
a comprehensive toolkit for achieving optimal allocation of assets and risk management. In 
practice, innovation has been promoted by exchanges, investment banking firms, insurance 
companies, brokerages, and international development banks. In the words of Robert Shiller, 
a Yale professor whose works have provided a source of inspiration for the author of this 
thesis, world financial centers have “served as the liveliest laboratory for new ideas in all of 
capitalism” (2003: 1). While this claim may seem a little overstated, innovations such as 
mortgage pass-through securities, real estate investment trusts (REITs), liquid-yield option 
notes (LYONs), index-linked certificates of deposit and bonds (e.g. TIPS in the US), and 
online discount brokerages, to name a few, rival major breakthroughs in real economy by 
their impact on the financial sector and the opportunities of economic agents. When well 
designed, financial innovations do an important job of improving the allocation of capital and 
sharing of risks. 
At the same time, there is still plenty of room for research and innovation in finance. For 
example, there is a vast array of risks that remain practically hidden. These risks are not 
traded, not managed properly and not shared. One observation is that current stock markets 
trade claims on only a fraction of national income represented by corporate earnings. Outside 
the corporate markets, most income flows are not securitized and not traded. Consequently, 
existing derivatives markets provide opportunities for managing of only a limited set of risks. 
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At the same time, the risks currently excluded from intermediation can be substantial. For 
instance, individuals face a major economic risk related to their occupations, i.e. the risk to 
their household income. Essentially, it is the risk that their skills and talents become 
worthless, not required by enterprises or society at large. This risk appears to be growing, as 
the pace of technological change increases and businesses become ever more mobile 
internationally. Commonly, individuals try to avoid occupational risks by forgoing 
opportunities, e.g. choosing ‘safe’ careers. Livelihood risks have been also traditionally 
cushioned by family (to a certain degree), or reduced by means of income redistribution by 
governments and charitable organizations. The important role of these social institutions is 
undisputed, but their evidently low efficiency as risk management devices calls for better 
arrangements as well. 
Ultimately, most agents in an economy incur macroeconomic risks, i.e. risks associated the 
performance of the overall economy. Many nations, both developed and developing, have 
gone through periods of economic success and failure. The well-known examples include the 
Great Depression; the disappointing performance of Japanese economy since 1989, after years 
of ‘wonder’; the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998 and its strong recent performance; 
a deep crisis in Argentina in 2001-2002. It may seem that with the currently available amount 
of historical data and constantly developing body of theoretical knowledge we could 
essentially predict and manage, or at least soften, such downturns ex ante. In reality, however, 
economists often offer ex-post explanations for fluctuations in national incomes that are not 
entirely trustworthy or consistent. It is also possible that macroeconomic risks will always 
remain unavoidable, since the global economy behaves more like a constantly evolving 
organism, rather than a mechanic system. At the same time, macroeconomic risks remain 
largely unmanaged. 
The presence of the unmanaged risks creates an opportunity for financial innovations that can 
help to re-allocate the risks efficiently. Those economic agents that would prefer to reduce or 
eliminate macroeconomic risks are likely to benefit from having an appropriate hedging tool 
at their disposal. Macroeconomic derivatives, i.e. derivatives indexed to macroeconomic 
indicators, appear to have the potential to fulfill this role. These derivatives already exist in 
practice and are starting to attract the attention of academic circles as well. Their innovative 
features and potential provided the author with a motivation for choosing macroeconomic 
derivatives as the broad subject of this thesis. The specific purpose of this work is to give a 
Introduction 
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comprehensive introduction to macroeconomic derivatives and to explore a particular area of 
their application. In an effort to make the discussion more practical and, at the same time, 
aligned with the international background and interests of the author, it was chosen to 
investigate closer the case of the use of GDP derivatives in conjunction with countries’ 
external debt, which has acquired particular practical relevance in the light of the recent 
Argentina’s bond exchange. 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter sets a basic theoretical background 
related to derivatives in general and options in particular. The second chapter provides a more 
detailed presentation of macroeconomic derivatives. It gives an overview of their features and 
peculiarities, their role and potential application. Further, it studies the history of 
macroeconomic derivatives and instruments similar in nature, with special attention to the 
evidence of market interest in these securities and major obstacles to their introduction. The 
final part of the chapter focuses on the current state of the markets for macroeconomic 
derivatives, including the Goldman Sachs/Deutsche Bank’s Economic Derivatives platform 
and the new Argentine offering of bonds with GDP warrants. The third chapter is dedicated to 
a specific application of macroeconomic derivatives, namely the issuance of GDP warrants 
along with external sovereign debt. First, it builds the case for GDP-linked bonds by 
surveying the academic literature, explaining the mechanism of GDP-linked debt, discussing 
its benefits to borrowing countries, and suggesting the ways to overcome potential obstacles. 
The second part of the chapter considers GDP-linked bonds from the point of view of 
investors, listing the advantages and reporting the opinions of the market participants. Finally, 
the third chapter provides the results of a quantitative evaluation of potential yields of GDP-
linked bonds, along with an important discussion of the methods of their valuation. A 
summary of the findings concludes the thesis. 
 
Chapter 1 General theoretical background 1.1 Derivatives 
1. General theoretical background 
This chapter lays out a general theoretical background for derivative securities. The theory 
presented here is very basic, since at the moment macroeconomic derivatives are not 
extensively covered in the literature and some of the issues relevant to them are still not 
settled. Most of the relevant theory, thus, will be treated integrally in the discussion of the 
following two main chapters. The first section of this chapter provides a definition and 
classification of derivatives, and discusses their purposes. The second section reviews the 
characteristics of option contracts and common pricing formulas. 
1.1 Derivatives 
1.1.1 Definition and classification 
Derivative securities can be generally defined as follows: 
A financial contract is a derivative security if its value at expiration date T is determined 
exactly by the market price of the underlying cash instrument at time T (Neftci, 2000). 
At expiration date T the price F(T) of a derivative security is completely determined by the 
value of the underlying asset. After the expiration date, the derivative ceases to exist. This 
property of derivatives has important implications for their pricing. The value of derivative 
F(t) is known deterministically only at exercise. The fact that the value of the derivative will 
be determined exactly in a known way also places some constraint on the prices of derivatives 
before expiration, thereby preventing speculative bubbles in the derivatives markets. 
The underlyings of derivative securities can be categorized into five main groups: 
1. Stocks (claims on returns generated by the real sector); 
2. Currencies (liabilities of governments, but not direct claims on real assets); 
3. Interest rates (notional assets designed to take positions in interest rates, as well as 
bonds, notes and T-bills); 
4. Indexes (notional amounts linked to an index); 
Chapter 1 General theoretical background 1.1 Derivatives 
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5. Commodities (physical assets, goods in kind). 
Derivative securities are traded on two distinct types of markets: derivatives exchanges and 
over-the-counter market. The exchange-traded contracts typically have standardized terms 
(e.g. contract size, maturity, features of the underlying) and are traded on organized markets. 
Over-the-counter (OTC) contracts, on the contrary, have custom terms and are created 
through an agreement between two parties, typically a dealer (a financial institution) and a 
user of the derivative contract. 
Derivative securities can be classified into two general groups: forward commitments and 
contingent claims. Forward commitments are obligations to buy or sell an underlying asset on 
a specified future date T at a forward price specified at the initiation of the contract. There 
exist two basic types of forward commitments: the OTC forward contracts and the 
standardized, exchange-traded futures. A distinct feature of forward commitments is that they 
are linear instruments: the payoff of these contracts at expiration is a linear function of the 
underlying asset’s value. 
Contingent claims, in contrast to forward commitments, give their holders a right to buy or 
sell an underlying asset at a price specified at the initiation of the contract (strike price). The 
right may be exercised on a specified future date T (for European-type contracts) or anytime 
before that date (for American-type contracts). Contingent claims are non-linear instruments, 
because their payoffs depend on the occurrence of a specific event. The holder of such 
contract will decide to exercise his/her right to buy or sell the underlying only under certain 
favorable conditions existing at the expiration date, or in other words, if a specific event 
happens. This feature makes payoffs of contracts of this type contingent on some event and, 
thus, non-linear. The most common form of a contingent claim is an option contract, which, 
in turn, can also be exchange-traded or OTC. Option-like features can also be embedded into 
other financial contracts, which makes them a form of contingent claims as well (see Fig. 
2.2). 
Chapter 1 General theoretical background 1.1 Derivatives 
 12
Standard options
Interest rate options
Warrants
Options on futures
Callable bonds
Convertible bonds
Exchange-Traded
Standard options
Interest rate options
Callable bonds
Convertible bonds
Exotic options
Warrants
Asset-backed securities
(with prepayment options)
Over-the-Counter
Contingent Claims
Futures
Exchange-Traded
Forward contracts
Swaps
Over-the-Counter
Forward Commitments
Derivatives
 
Figure 1.1 A classification of derivatives 
Source: Chance (2003) 
1.1.2 Purposes of derivatives markets 
Derivatives markets serve several purposes in the economic system and financial markets. 
Futures markets, for example, fulfill an important function of price discovery. Futures prices 
provide valuable information about the market expectations regarding the future prices of the 
underlying assets. Futures price can be used as a proxy for the prices of the underlying assets, 
especially in place of the uncertain future prices. Option markets provide information on 
market expectations as well, but in a different manner: option prices can be used to determine 
the implied volatility of the price of the underlying asset. 
The most important purpose of derivatives is, perhaps, risk management, which can be 
defined as process of modifying the actual level of risk to match the desired level of risk. This 
activity is often called ‘hedging’, which generally refers to the reduction or elimination of 
risk. The other side of this process is often called ‘speculation’. Hedging and speculation are 
traditionally seen as complimentary activities, where hedgers seek to eliminate risk and 
speculators seek to assume risk. However, both activities may interact and intersect one with 
another, so that it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between a hedging and a 
speculative strategy. Both of them involve taking a view on the future outcomes of the 
underlying variable, and both can be described as risk management. 
Derivatives markets also serve the purpose of improving market efficiency for the underlying 
assets. Derivatives provide tools for exploiting arbitrage opportunities when they exist, and 
thus help to eliminate these same arbitrage opportunities and ensure fair and competitive asset 
pricing. 
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An additional benefit of derivatives markets is that they allow investors to reduce transaction 
costs. Trading in derivatives is typically much less expensive than trading in the underlying 
asset itself. A reason for such difference is that derivatives serve as a form of insurance and as 
such cannot have an excessively high cost relative to the asset being insured, or else they 
would not exist. 
1.2 Options 
Since a significant part of the thesis primarily deals with option-like securities, the rest of this 
background chapter focuses on derivatives of this type. This section proceeds to describe the 
general characteristics of option contracts and the most common pricing formulas. 
1.2.1 Characteristics of option contracts 
This subsection outlines the characteristics of the basic class of option contracts – stock 
options. The payoffs of option contracts at expiration are described and the factors affecting 
option prices before expiration are discussed. 
There are two most common types of option contracts: call options, which give their owners 
the right to buy the underlying asset on or before a specified date, and put options, which give 
their owners the right to sell the underlying asset on or before a specified date. At expiration, 
the value of a European call option is either zero or the difference between the price of 
underlying asset and the exercise (strike) price, whichever is greater, i.e. 
 cT = max [ST – K, 0] (1.1) 
Similarly, the value of a European put option is either zero or the difference between the 
exercise (strike) price and the price of underlying asset, whichever is greater, i.e. 
 pT = max [K – ST, 0] (1.2) 
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The payoffs of a call and put options to the buyer and the seller at expiration are demonstrated 
on Fig. 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Payoffs of European-type options at expiration 
Source: Hull (2003) 
Before expiration, option prices are determined by several factors, instead of just the strike 
price and the value of the underlying. These factors are listed below: 
1. Current price of the underlying (S0), 
2. Strike price of the option (K), 
3. Time to expiration (T), 
4. Volatility of the price of underlying (s ), 
5. Risk-free interest rate (rf), 
6. Cash flows associated with the underlying that are expected to be paid during the life 
of the option (e.g. dividends on a stock). 
The two first factors affect the option price through their effect on the expected payoff of the 
option. In fact, it is the relationship between the two that influences the price of an option. 
The more the price of the underlying exceeds the strike price of a call option, the more the 
option becomes valuable. Similarly, the more the price of the underlying falls below the strike 
Payoff Payoff
ST STK
K
Payoff Payoff
ST STK
K
(a) long call (b) short call
(c) long put (d) short put
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price of a put option, the more the option becomes valuable. The difference between the 
current price of the underlying and the strike price, bounded below by zero, or in other words, 
the payoff of the option if it were exercised immediately, is called ‘intrinsic value’ of the 
option and constitutes one of the two components of the options’ value. For a call option, the 
intrinsic value is max(So - K, 0), and for a put option max(K - So, 0). Figure 1.3 demonstrates 
the effect of the changes in the price of the underlying on the value of call and put options 
(fixed parameters are K = 25, T = 5, s  = 0.25, r f  = 0.05, no cash flows expected). 
0
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
c
S
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
p
S
 
(a) Call option (b) Put option 
Figure 1.3 The effects of changes in underlying price on option values 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Time to expiration typically has a direct relationship with the option price. For two options 
that differ by their expiration date but otherwise are identical, the option with a longer time to 
expiration is usually at least as valuable as the one with shorter time to expiration. For 
American options this relationship is even more pronounced, since a longer-life American 
option gives its holder more exercise opportunities than a shorter-life option. There ma y be 
some exceptions to the rule above: (1) far out-of-the-money or in-the-money options, for 
which additional time to expiration makes no difference, and (2) European puts, for the 
holders of which waiting additional time implies lost interest on the money they would have 
received from a shorter-life option and invested. In general, nevertheless, time to expiration 
contributes to the ‘time value’ of the option, which is the second key component of option’s 
value. In fact, time value is expected to decrease as time approaches the expiration date, so 
that the option’s value approaches the intrinsic value. Figure 1.4 demonstrates the effect of the 
time to expiration on the value of call and put options (fixed parameters are S0 = 25, K = 25, s  
= 0.25, rf  = 0.05, no cash flows expected). 
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Figure 1.4 The effects of changes in time to expiration on option values 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Time value of an option reflects the possibility of favorable future movements of the price of 
the underlying. This possibility, naturally, depends also on the volatility of the underlying. 
When volatility increases, it improves the chances that the option will have a good payoff 
when exercised. A rise in volatility increases the chances of unfavorable performance of the 
underlying as well, but the option holder is protected from negative payoffs by the design of 
the option contract. Thus, when volatility of an underlying asset increases, the value of the 
options written on this underlying also increases. Figure 1.5 demonstrates the effect of the 
changes in volatility on the value of call and put options (fixed parameters are S0 = 25, K = 
25, T = 5, rf  = 0.05, no cash flows expected). It is worth noting here that volatility is a critical 
factor for option prices, but at the same time it cannot be directly observed on the market.  
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Figure 1.5 The effects of changes in volatility on option values 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Interest rates affect option prices in a less obvious way. A call option can be represented as a 
leveraged position in an underlying. Thus, when the interest rates are high, buying a call 
instead of borrowing money to buy the underlying is more attractive. Conversely, put holders 
lose potential interest on the money they would have received from selling the underlying 
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asset immediately, and this opportunity costs makes holding a put less attractive when interest 
rates are high. Thus, rising interest rates increase the value of call options and decrease the 
value of put options. 
The cash flows associated with the underlying asset influence option values through the price 
of the underlying itself. Such payments as dividends on stocks, coupon interest on bonds, 
interest on foreign currency, and carrying costs of commodities all have effects on the prices 
of the respective assets. For example, a dividend on a stock tends to decrease the stock’s 
price. Consequently, the value of a call option would be reduced, and the value of a put option 
would be increased, in proportion to the amount of anticipated dividends on the stock. 
1.2.2 The Black-Scholes pricing formulas 
The use of Black-Scholes pricing formulas is now virtually the standard approach for the 
valuation of most European-type options. Their application is not limited to options on traded 
securities, as they can be employed in corporate finance and valuation of real options as well. 
This subsection briefly reviews the assumptions underlying the Black-Scholes-Merton model 
and presents the formulas themselves. 
The model was first derived by using a no-arbitrage argument, i.e. that there are no riskless 
arbitrage opportunities. The other assumptions of the model are as follows: 
· Process followed by the underlying: the price of the underlying variable is assumed to 
follow geometric lognormal diffusion process. This process in most cases does not 
correspond exactly to the reality, but it offers a convenient and reasonable approximation. 
· Development of the risk-free rate: the model does not allow the risk-free rate to be random, 
assuming that it is known and constant. This assumption creates problems for pricing of 
options on interest rates and bonds. However, even for these options it is usually possible 
to obtain a reasonably reliable estimate of the options’ value, especially when special 
adjustments are made (e.g. convexity and timing adjustments). 
· Development of volatility: the volatility of the underlying assets is assumed to be constant 
during the life of the option and requires to be estimated, being one of the critical input 
factors. Obviously, the volatility of the underlying may change in reality, as it is usually 
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the case with stock prices, for example. Considerable research has been conducted in this 
area and models have been developed to deal with stochastic volatility. 
· Technical assumptions: it is commonly assumed in derivatives pricing that there are no 
taxes or transaction costs involved in security trading. This assumption is clearly 
unrealistic, but it allows distinguishing the fundamental factors behind option prices. It is 
also possible to relax this requirement. Additionally, the Black-Scholes model assumes that 
the trading in the underlying is continuous, which is not very far from reality for securities 
trading daily or on electronic exchanges that function without closures. 
· Cash flows of the underlying: the basic form of the Black-Scholes formula is valid only for 
the underlyings that do not pay any cash flows. However, the model is easily modified to 
accommodate the cash flows associated with the underlying asset. 
· Early exercise: in most cases the Black-Scholes formula can be used only for European-
type options. For American options, binominal model with a large number of periods is 
deemed more appropriate. 
The basic Black-Scholes formulas for pricing European call and put options on a non-
dividend paying security are as follows: 
 )()( 210 dNXedNSc
Trf--= , (1.3) 
 )()( 102 dNSdNXep
Trf ---= - , (1.4) 
where 
 
T
TrXS
d f
s
s ]2/[)/ln( 20
1
++
= , (1.5) 
 Tdd s-= 12 , (1.6) 
S0 is the current price of the underlying, X the strike price of the option, rf the continuously 
compounded risk-free rate, s  the volatility (standard deviation) of the continuously 
compounded return on the underlying, T time to maturity, and N(•) is cumulative probability 
distribution function for the standard normal distribution. 
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2. Macroeconomic Derivatives 
Macroeconomic derivatives are a special case among financial derivative contracts. They 
have particular characteristics and benefits, and their introduction and use presents particular 
challenges. Highlighting these peculiarities, this chapter provides an overview of the features 
of macroeconomic derivatives, their general role and applications, reviews the attempts of 
creating markets for these instruments, identifies the major obstacles that plagued these 
attempts, and, finally, describes the current state of affairs. 
2.1 Overview 
To provide the reader with an overview of macroeconomic derivatives, it is first useful to 
define these instruments and discuss the features that set them apart from other derivatives, 
and in particular the features of their underlyings. This section then proceeds to describe the 
theoretical role of macroeconomic derivatives and to suggest a number of practical 
applications and benefits. 
2.1.1 Definition and features 
The definition of derivatives provided in subsection 1.1.1 can be adapted to macroeconomic 
derivatives in the following way: 
Macroeconomic derivatives are financial contracts whose value at the expiration date T is 
determined by the value of an underlying macroeconomic indicator at time T. 
In a general sense, macroeconomic derivatives were first proposed by Marshall et al. in 1992. 
Specifically, they suggested to create a new class of swaps called ‘macroeconomic swaps’ and 
a related class of options – ‘macroeconomic options’. A macroeconomic swap would be 
similar to an ordinary fix-for-floating swap, but the floating leg of this swap would be tied to 
a macroeconomic variable such as GDP, orders for durable goods, wholesale price indices, 
etc. The end user and a macro swap dealer would exchange period payments based on the 
prevailing value of the floating macroeconomic variable and a fixed coupon rate. 
Macroeconomic options have some macroeconomic index, or a function of such index, as 
their reference rate, in place of the underlying asset’s ‘price’. A macroeconomic option gives 
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its owner the right to receive at expiration time T the difference between the value of an 
underlying macroeconomic index or a function of such index at time T and the option’s strike 
price K. For example, an option on GDP may have the following payout at time T (in per cent 
of its notional amount): 
 CT = max [gT – g*, 0], (2.1) 
where gT is the actual GDP growth rate and g* is the strike defined in terms of GDP growth, 
i.e. a ‘baseline’ growth rate. Currently, macroeconomic derivatives exist in practice mostly in 
the form of options on macroeconomic statistics. 
Macroeconomic derivatives are certainly not limited to the particular types of instruments 
described above. Macroeconomic derivatives can be indexed to a variety of indicators, such as 
economic growth, inflation, real-estate prices or employment data. The group of 
macroeconomic derivatives may potentially include macroeconomic forwards and futures, or 
indeed any other type of financial instrument. Macroeconomic derivatives can also be 
embedded into other financial contracts (it is in this quality that they first manifested 
themselves in practice). Basically, it is not form of the financial contracts itself that is novel 
about macroeconomic derivatives, but their underlyings. 
The distinct feature of macroeconomic derivatives is that their underlying ‘assets’ in most 
cases cannot actually be traded or held. For many conventional derivatives, the underlying 
assets are physical assets or claims on such assets that can be bought and sold in organized 
markets. A stock derivative has as an underlying a (usually) traded claim on the corporate 
profits. An interest rate derivative has as an underlying a notional asset that allows taking 
positions in interest rates. On the other hand, there is no such asset or claim for a derivative on 
inflation. Although one can arguably buy the goods that are included in the basket for the 
calculation of an inflation index, holding the goods even for a month might not be 
practicable.1 In the case of a derivative on national income the underlying is even more 
complicated. While a claim on national income can be imagined (cf proposals by Shiller, 
1993 and 2003) or even created (see the example of New Singapore Shares in subsection 
3.2.2), no markets for such claims currently exist. 
                                                 
1 It is now possible to replicate the underlying of an inflation-linked derivative by combining government 
inflation-indexed securities and nominal government securities (see ‘CPI Futures at CME’ in Section 2.3.2) 
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Contractually, the lack of a tradable underlying asset does not pose any problems for 
derivatives, since the latter can be made contingent on virtually any event, even weather-
related. However, it creates another technical problem: the impossibility of arbitrage would 
leave the markets for macroeconomic derivatives without a mechanism of price convergence 
towards a ‘fair’, non-arbitrage value. Moreover, it makes the use of conventional pricing tools 
based on no-arbitrage arguments questionable, so market participants may find it difficult to 
obtain an estimate of a fair price for these securities. 
There are also other distinctive properties of the underlyings of the macroeconomic 
derivatives. In contrast to conventional securities, which represent claims on the future cash 
flows of the corresponding assets, macroeconomic variables are ‘flow’ variables that measure 
an economic phenomenon during a certain period of time, and this feature, naturally, restircts 
the volatility of the macroeconomic variable. In addition, the values of macroeconomic 
indicators are typically reported in a discrete manner, with intervals between subsequent 
values ranging from a week to a quarter. This property constraints any macroeconomic option 
that does not span several announcements of the underlying data to be of the European type. 
Some of the macroeconomic variables that are good candidates for the underlyings of 
macroeconomic derivatives also have a large time lag between their publication and the actual 
occurrence of the economic phenomena they are supposed to measure, and the reported data 
themselves are subject to substantial post-announcement revisions. 
Taking into account these properties of the underlyings, the value of a macroeconomic option 
before expiration can be represented with the following function: 
 F(E[ST |It], K), (2.2) 
where E[ST|It] is the expectation of the outcome of the underlying variable conditional on the 
information available at time t, and K is the strike price. E[ST|It] replaces St in a price function 
of a conventional option, since the underlying variable for a macroeconomic option does not 
have observable values before expiration date T.2 Arguably, E[ST|It] would not change as 
                                                 
2 In case of a long-term macroeconomic option, whose life spans several data announcements, the underlying 
variable may have intermediate observable values before expiration. Nevertheless, not all t would have a 
corresponding value of the underlying, so the intermediate values would rather influence the value of the option 
by providing new information on possible future outcomes of the underlying, i.e. through It. 
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often as the prices of conventional underlying assets due to the absence of active trading. For 
example, most market participants, conceivably, do not update their forecasts of future GDP 
on a daily basis, so, according to (3.2), their valuations of options on GDP would change less 
frequently. Similar argument may apply to the forecasts of corporate earnings as well, but 
stock prices may change on a daily basis due to trading by various groups of market 
participants, including those guided by other considerations rather than fundamentals. 
Moreover, apart from the effect of discounting, the price of a macroeconomic option may not 
depend directly on time to expiration (hence the absence of T from F(•) above). Conventional 
option prices typically converge to the options’ intrinsic values as the expiration date 
approaches, even if discount rates are very low. This may not be the case on the markets for 
macroeconomic options. The difference may be illustrated by comparing the distribution of 
the terminal value of the underlying assets implied by the option prices before expiration. As 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates, for conventional options the distribution becomes more ‘compact’ as 
time to maturity decreases (panel (a)), while the market for macroeconomic options may not 
display this pattern (panel (b)). In fact, it can be seen from Fig. 3.1(b) that the shorter-life 
option prices imply a distribution that is even less peaked than that implied by the longer-life 
options. This illustrates that macroeconomic options may face relatively high uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of the underlying variable even when time to maturity is very small. 
The phenomenon may be explained by the following intuition. The prices of macroeconomic 
options would depend on the expectations regarding the outcome of the underlying, as 
expressed in (3.2) and the expectations would, in turn, be conditional on the information 
available at the time. While more information may be expected to become available as time 
passes, this information typically arrives to the market randomly. Additionally, 
macroeconomic options lack the information provided by the prices of the underlying assets 
in the case of conventional options. Hence, if there is no new information, the price of the 
option may not change significantly even as expiration approaches. 
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(a) S&P500 options with April, May and June ’92 
expirations, as of 01/04/1992 
(b) HICP ex Tobacco options with July and August ‘04 
expirations, as of 21/06/04 
Figure 2.1 Risk-neutral probability density functions implied by option prices 
Source: (a) Dumas et al. (1998); (b) Goldman Sachs (http://www.gs.com/econderivs/). 
The above considerations have important implications for the pricing of macroeconomic 
options. In particular, they may render the standard option pricing tools such as the Black-
Scholes model not applicable for macroeconomic options, which have to be valued, instead, 
using other tools, such as general equilibrium models. 
Another set of problems associated with the use of macroeconomic variables as underlyings 
for derivatives is the access to information, measurement biases and misreporting. 
Conceivably, those with better access to information about the forthcoming release of 
macroeconomic data would have an unfair advantage on a macroeconomic derivatives 
market. In essence, the issue, however, is not very different from the one with insider trading 
in conventional securities, and hence can be reduced with similar regulatory methods. 
Measurement biases in macroeconomic data that are introduced by statistical and data 
collection methods, such as sampling errors or interpolation, may be more difficult to 
eliminate when more accurate methods are impractical or unavailable. It can be argued, 
though, that as long as information on the possible biases is freely available and, hence, priced 
in, this problem does not constitute an obstacle to using macroeconomic derivatives. The 
possibility of data misrepresentation, or the moral hazard problem, can certainly create an 
issue once macroeconomic derivatives gain significance enough to offer financial rewards for 
those involved with the determination of the values of macroeconomic indicators. Yet again, 
misrepresentation occurs with corporate data as well: stock markets have witnessed many 
episodes of misreporting throughout their history. It always remains a possibility that 
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investors should be aware of, and that should presumably be reflected in asset prices. To sum 
up, the data problems with underlying variables for macroeconomic derivatives might cause 
uncertainty and turbulence on the market, but would not necessarily prevent it from 
functioning. 
2.1.2 Theoretical role 
Marshall et al. (1992), although having introduced macroeconomic derivatives, did not 
consider their wider and more fundamental role, which is the subject of this subsection. 
In a wide economic perspective, macroeconomic derivatives could be a significant step 
towards complete risk-sharing. Firstly, macroeconomic derivatives provide a way of trading 
macroeconomic risks. As stressed by Shiller (1993), these risks are among the most important 
risks to the incomes of firms and individuals, and there is a need for markets that could help 
to price and re-distibute these risks. Specifically, Shiller (1993) introduces the idea of 
establishing a system of large national and international markets for long-term claims on all 
major aggregate income flows: national incomes, occupational incomes, and service flows 
from commercial and residential real estate. The creation of markets for a wide array of 
income flows, according to Shiller, would provide new opportunities for comprehensive risk 
management, as well as price discovery for major risks that are substantially hidden today. 
Issuance of instruments with payouts linked to GDP of a country, or to other macroeconomic 
indicators, could do a great deal to reduce country risk and promote welfare. Ultimately, such 
instruments should allow individuals to better hedge all types of risks to their living standards. 
In a later work (2003), Shiller incorporates the idea of macro markets into his ambitious 
vision of the ‘new financial order’, a broad vision of risk management in the contemporary 
economy. Developing the idea further, he argues that macro markets should be created with 
conceptually simple claims, so that they are easily accessible and reveal information on the 
current value of a claim on national income. Such claims, represented by ‘macro securities’, 
should be on the flow of index values extending into indefinite future and thus would 
resemble stocks. Shiller admits that macro securities are not likely to provide insurance 
against all specific risks faced by corporations and individuals. The reason is that the 
economic risks are multiple and difficult to define in detail, if nothing else. Instead, macro 
securities are supposed to help manage risk measured in terms of large national aggregates, 
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such as GDP. To a certain extent, these indicators summarize the risk factors affecting an 
economy and its agents, and hence can be used in risk management of individuals, 
corporations and even whole countries. Currently, however, there are no markets for claims 
on national incomes or components thereof, so macroeconomic derivatives in the form of 
options on economic statistics provide at the moment the only practical tool for the 
management of macroeconomic risks. 
Secondly, macroeconomic derivatives revive an interesting theoretical opportunity within the 
framework of the intertemporal consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) 
developed by Breeden (1979). This model states a linear relationship between expected real 
return on assets and expected changes in aggregate real consumption, which can be expressed 
as 
 E(Rj) = Rf + ßjC [E(?C*) – Rf], (2.3) 
where ßjC is a ‘real consumption beta’, defined as the local covariance of the real return of the 
asset j with percentage changes in aggregate real consumption ?C*, divided by the variance 
rate of changes in aggregate real consumption (Breeden, 1979)3. Leaving aside the issue of 
the empirical validity of the CCAPM, it can be seen that in the framework of this model a 
derivative security on aggregate consumption would play the same role as index derivatives 
play in the simple CAPM world. Such a security would provide investors with a cost-efficient 
instrument for participating in the market advances or corrections without having to engage in 
diversification across all assets, and a tool for portfolio protection. Moreover, a market for 
options on aggregate consumption would permit to infer the implied distribution of the future 
aggregate consumption, which, in turn, could be used to find the value of any asset, according 
to the following general formula: 
                                                 
3 This is a general definition of the CCAPM in a multi-good economy as provided by Breeden (1979), and is the 
one most useful for this discussion. Commonly, however, the CCAPM is defined in terms of a portfolio most 
correlated with aggregate consumption, so that the CCAPM equation takes the following form: 
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where ßcc is the beta of the portfolio c with respect to the aggregate consumption, ßjc is the beta of the asset j with 
respect to the portfolio c, and Rc is the return on the portfolio c. 
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where Vj is the value of asset j at time 0, E[xT | CT] are its expected payoffs conditional on the 
states of aggregate consumption CT, and PT(CT) are the prices of an elementary claims on 
aggregate consumption, which can be obtained from the prices of options on aggregate 
consumption (Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978). 
Practically, however, aggregate consumption in the CCAPM is commonly related to private 
expenditures on (non-durable) goods and services4, and a liquid market for derivatives tied to 
this variable might be not very realistic. Moreover, even if such securities existed, the model 
itself would have to be adapted to reduce the influence of the econometric problems 
associated with the underlying variable. The CCAPM prices assets relative to changes in 
aggregate consumption between two points of time. The national accounts, in contrast, 
provide data on total expenditures on goods and services over a period of time. This 
difference can create problems for the CCAPM, since expenditures need not equal 
consumption, as the goods are not always consumed when they are purchased. Moreover, the 
reported expenditures are closer to an integral of expenditures over a period of time than to 
‘spot’ expenditures. This second problem introduces a ‘summation bias’ (Breeden et al., 
1989). The problem of infrequent reporting of the underlying variable, general to 
macroeconomic derivatives, would also be relevant in this case. 
Finally, macroeconomic derivatives may help improve the sharing of risks across different 
countries, which is currently incomplete. Shiller (2004) points out that complete risk sharing 
in a stochastic endowment economy with non-stochastic preferences, according to the 
CCAPM, would imply that real consumption fluctuations should be perfectly correlated 
across all individuals in the world. This result follows since with complete risk management 
any fluctuations in individual endowments are completely pooled, and only world risk 
remains. However, real consumption changes are not perfectly correlated across countries, as 
demonstrated by several empirical studies, including Canova and Ravn (1996), Crucini 
(1999), Lewis (1996), Pakko (1998). Moreover, the correlation of changes in consumption is 
even lower than the correlation of income changes across countries (Backus et al., 1992). 
                                                 
4 For example, Breeden at al. (1989) used this data in an empirical test of the CCAPM. 
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Basing on these considerations, the above-mentioned authors arrive to a conclusion that 
international risk sharing is far from perfect. 
An alternative confirmation of this conclusion is provided by Iwata and Wu (2004), who 
follow an ‘asset-pricing’ approach by comparing marginal utility growth rates extracted from 
asset returns. This approach is based on a postulate that if macroeconomic risk is fully shared 
by international investors, the cross-country marginal utility growth rates should have a 
correlated response to macroeconomic shocks. The study finds that international investors do 
share the risks associated with exogenous financial market shocks through existing asset 
markets. However, other macroeconomic risks, such as those related to exogenous shocks to 
consumption growth, inflation and monetary policies are not fully shared across countries. 
There is also other evidence that country-specific risks are significant, but currently 
undiversified. To quantify these risks, defined as country growth uncertainty, Athanasoulis et 
al. (1999) perform a cross-country regression analysis of economic growth on a set of 49 
countries under various horizons using data for 1950-1990. They find that the standard 
deviation of the growth rate at a 35-year horizon amounts to 33% (16.4% for OECD countries 
only). Alternatively, they estimate that the probability that the unweighted average GDP per 
capita of the 7 best performing countries unexpectedly doubles, triples, or quadruples at the 
35-year horizon relative to the same measure for the 7 worst performing countries is 99.9%, 
89.4% and 29%, respectively. 
Other studies find that there are substantial, yet unrealized welfare gains from international 
risk sharing. For example, Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001), using an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model, found that arrangements to swap risks between countries would have 
significant welfare gains. An application of the model to the data on the GDP of G-7 countries 
in 1950-1992 revealed that creating two optimal risk-sharing contracts among the countries in 
the study would produce permanent yearly welfare gains of $400 per capita for nearly every 
country (almost $1000 for Japan). Similarly, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) found 
that potential welfare gains from risk sharing (measured in permanent percentage increase in 
expected consumption that leads to an equivalent increase in welfare) are quite sizeable: 6.6% 
for a 35-year horizon for a set of 49 countries and 1.5% for the same horizon for OECD 
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countries.5 Obviously, when risk management contracts are applied to developing countries, 
where risks appear to be larger, or extended down to the individual level, the potential welfare 
gains increase. For example, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1997), using historical data 
from 1870 to 1990, found that the welfare gain from risk sharing could amount to 16.5% for a 
broad set of 24 countries versus 4.9% for a small set of rich countries. 
2.1.3 Risk management applications 
Considering the important role of the macroeconomic derivatives and the fundamentality of 
the economic variables they are associated with, these instruments appear to be potentially 
useful in a variety of practical applications. One of such promising applications is the use of 
macroeconomic derivatives by companies, investors and individuals for hedging 
macroeconomic risks, which is the subject of this subsection. 
Risk management is said to be generally more effective when risks can be precisely isolated. 
Macroeconomic derivatives provide payoffs closely related to specific economic outcomes, 
helping to insure effectively against the risks associated with these outcomes without any 
basis risk. Hence, financial contracts on consumer sentiment indices, payrolls, housing starts 
or GDP growth, especially those that have sufficiently long maturity, open new risk 
management opportunities for investors, companies, and through them, subsequently, 
individuals. 
It is intuitively clear that companies can use various types of macroeconomic derivatives as a 
hedge against external economic forces that impact their performance. However, it can be 
argued that hedging with macroeconomic derivatives is more appropriate for investors than 
for corporations. According to the Modigliani-Miller paradigm, such hedging activities will 
not increase the value of the firm. Hence, if companies are acting in the best interests of 
shareholders, they should not engage in hedging, since their shareholders may be able to 
manage the risks involved more easily themselves, should they wish so. Furthermore, 
                                                 
5 Some previous studies found much lower welfare gains, see van Wincoop (1999) for a review and explanation 
of the differences. On the other hand, the gains reported above may be even underestimated due to possible 
secondary-level benefits from risk sharing. 
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investors may wish to use such protection in terms of their whole portfolio rather than a single 
share of stock. 
Certainly, this argument only holds in the case of symmetric information, i.e. if shareholders 
have as much information about the risks faced by the company as its management. DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1991), in fact, demonstrated that if a company has proprietary information on its 
risk exposure and does not make it available to the shareholders, it may be in the interests of 
the shareholders that the company engages in financial hedging. This, however, may not be 
true in the case of macroeconomic risks: conceivably, it should be fairly easy for a 
shareholder to identify the exposure of the company to a macroeconomic variable, even 
basing on the information commonly disclosed by corporations. If so, the use of 
macroeconomic derivatives for hedging may be more appropriate for investors rather than 
corporations. 
Conversely, if the firm does have proprietary information about the source and magnitude of 
the macroeconomic risks it faces, risk-averse shareholders may benefit from the use of 
macroeconomic derivatives for hedging these risks. Macroeconomic derivatives would also 
help to decrease the amount of ‘noise’ in corporate performance measures and increase their 
informativeness in respect to the ability of the firm’s management (DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1995). There are other factors that may make such hedging beneficial in terms of the firm’s 
value: bankruptcy costs and the structure of the corporate tax code (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Additionally, if external financing is more expensive for corporations than internally 
generated funds, hedging helps to ensure that the company has sufficient internal funds, 
thereby increasing value (Froot et al., 1993). Finally, if transaction costs are non-trivial, it 
may be less expensive for a company to execute a hedging transaction than for an individual 
shareholder. 
In such cases, it may be reasonable for a corporation to engage in hedging with the use of, 
inter alia, macroeconomic derivatives, as first proposed by Marshall et al. (1992). Leaving 
aside the issues of general hedging strategy discussed above, they suggested that 
macroeconomic swaps and options had the potential to become the first effective tool for 
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managing business cycle risk.6 For companies that face cyclical (or countercyclical) sales, a 
macro swap would allow to exchange a series of fixed payments for a series of variable 
payments tied to a macroeconomic variable. If the underlying variable is well-chosen, i.e. it 
exhibits high correlation with the firm’s operating cash flows, such companies would be able 
to hedge their ‘quantity’, or macroeconomic risk. For example, an entertainment company 
might have revenue that is closely correlated to a consumer confidence index. To reduce 
volatility in its earnings, then, the company could buy a macro swap tied to consumer 
confidence figures, or perhaps, a macro collar, which would also reduce the cost of hedging. 
In a follow-up paper to Marshall et al. (1992), Bansal et al. (1994) studied the potential 
effectiveness of a hedge that uses a macroeconomic swap on a consumer confidence index. 
They measured the correlation of the revenues of ten US firms with two different confidence 
indices. After adjusting for autocorrelation, it was found that the ability of a consumer 
confidence index to explain revenue volatility differs significantly among the firms in the 
study: the highest R2 was 0.5864 and the lowest 0.07. In a second test, Bansal et al. (1995) 
looked at the correlation of corporate revenues with GDP and showed that derivatives on 
GDP can provide an excellent hedge. For several of the firms they studied, the coefficients of 
determination, even after adjusting for autocorrelation, exceeded 0.90. On the basis of these 
results, Bansal et al. concluded that macroeconomic derivates have considerable potential to 
offer a viable tool for hedging business cycle risk for corporations. 
Schweimayer (2003) studied the hedging potential of macroeconomic derivatives on the case 
of a fictional U.S. retail chain. He constructed a synthetic macro index, which consisted of US 
non-seasonally adjusted monthly retail sales data for two product groups, and used the annual 
returns on the index as an underlying for a European put option. Assuming that the macro 
index could explain 90% of the revenue variation of the fictional enterprise, he examined how 
the payouts of the put options and the cost of hedging influenced the profit of the enterprise 
under study. The results suggest that the use of macroeconomic put options in a hedging 
strategy can improve corporate profits, assuming unchanged volatility of the annual earnings. 
                                                 
6 Business cycle risk refers to the variation in corporate performance measures due to variations in the general 
level of economic activity. 
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Apart from the above results, a variety of other hedging applications for macroeconomic 
derivatives can be designed. For example, a company, whose inputs are inflation-indexed 
(e.g. wages and salaries of its workers are tied to a CPI), may find a contract on inflation 
useful. If the company cannot pass the input price increases on to its customers through retail 
prices, its earnings may suffer. A long position in inflation futures may help to solve this 
problem. As another example, a multinational corporation may want to use derivatives on the 
macroeconomic indicators of the countries where it operates. There is strong evidence that 
corporate shares are now priced globally, i.e. the market takes into consideration the portfolio 
of domestic and international value in a company’s aggregate value (Diermeier and Solnik, 
2001). The greater the proportion of international sales, the greater is the likelihood that the 
stock is influenced by non-domestic factors. If this is the case, the company might want to 
hedge some of its international exposures with macroeconomic derivatives (e.g. options on 
GDP) in order to smooth earnings and increase the share price.7 
Macroeconomic derivatives can be useful to purely financial market players as well. 
Economic data releases are among the most anticipated news events in the financial world. 
Surprises in announcements of such indicators as central bank policy rates, employment 
figures, consumer price index, and manufacturing indices typically influence the prices of 
financial assets.8 Since the data releases would also determine the payout of macroeconomic 
derivatives, the latter can be used by traders to hedge their portfolio against adverse price 
changes due to an outcome of a particular economic variable. 
Financial institutions may also find macroeconomic derivatives useful in the following way. 
Broll et al. (2004) suggest that macroeconomic derivatives are a valuable tool for commercial 
banks, since they enable lenders to sell the systematic part of the credit risk, according to what 
capital market theory suggests. Normal credit derivatives do not offer such opportunity. As 
yet another application, a financial intermediary may want to use inflation-based derivatives 
in order to hedge its exposures in inflation-linked swaps or inflation-indexed government 
bonds. 
                                                 
7 This suggestion has not been explored thoroughly yet, but such discussion is outside the scope of this paper. 
8 Evidence for the US bond market provided in Furfine (2001). 
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Finally, individuals can ultimately benefit from macroeconomic derivatives as well. A worker 
concerned about a possible future decline in his occupational income might be able to reduce 
the associated financial consequences by buying a ‘livelihood insurance’, as suggested by 
Shiller (2003). Such insurance would pay out a regular supplement to the worker’s income if 
average wages in a particular occupation decline. For occupational insurance policies to 
become a possibility, insurance companies must be able to hedge the risks they take in writing 
out retail insurance contracts. They could do this on a market for claims on occupational 
incomes, the need for which was pointed out already in 1971 by Brainard and Dolbaer. 
Although short of being such claims, derivatives on average salaries by major occupations 
would, nevertheless, fulfill the proposed role, i.e. would provide insurance companies with a 
tool for managing the risks they assume. In this application, though, it is likely that the 
derivatives traded may need to have longer maturities than common in today’s derivatives 
markets. 
In a similar fashion, a market for contracts on real estate prices could make new insurance 
products available to individuals, as it would permit insurance companies and speculators to 
take positions in real estate.9 Such products may enjoy a strong demand in many countries, 
where home equity typically constitutes a large part of an individuals’ net worth. A 
homeowner, for example, who intends to sell the property at a future date and fears a decline 
of its price, would benefit from buying protection in the form of an insurance policy, which 
pays out if the average house prices, or even better, the average house prices in the area, 
decline by the time of the property sale. An insurance company offering the policies to retail 
customers would then hedge its risk with derivatives on house prices. Again, such products 
should have sufficient maturity to be appealing in hedging applications. 
2.1.4 Other benefits 
Macroeconomic derivatives can certainly have applications beyond hedging. They might even 
open new opportunities, which have never been considered so far. Although such applications 
                                                 
9 Derivatives on real estate prices may be useful to investors in general as well. Such contracts can be used for 
portfolio diversification, since real estate prices typically behave differently from the stock markets. However, in 
this role any new derivative products might be overshadowed by REITs, which already enjoy a wide market 
acceptance. 
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are outside the main focus of this paper, it is still worth to mention the benefits that 
macroeconomic derivatives provide for position takers and the market in general. 
To speculate on macroeconomic data releases, position takers would typically take major 
positions in bonds, stocks and currencies. Macroeconomic derivatives provide a more 
efficient and cost-effective alternative for taking positions on the outcomes of the 
macroeconomic variables. Firstly, their payouts are by design 100% correlated with the 
variable, relative to which the position is taken. Secondly, trading in macroeconomic 
derivatives can be much cheaper than other alternatives, as derivatives in general are 
characterized by relatively low transaction costs. Thus, for financial firms macroeconomic 
derivatives provide an efficient vehicle to leverage an in-house economic expertise. They 
might also be profitably included in the strategies carried out by the hedge funds.10 
Informative function Macroeconomic derivatives have an additional broader benefit: their 
prices can be used to infer a quantitative estimate of market expectations regarding a 
particular macroeconomic variable. A clear indication of market expectations would be useful 
for investment decision-making, since the investment process usually involves judgments 
about macroeconomic risks. In fact, investors constantly pay attention to the prices of various 
financial assets in order to determine what potential or expected outcomes are priced-in. 
However, given the large information flow that influences the market prices of most assets, 
such estimates are bound to be imprecise. Liquid markets for macroeconomic derivatives 
would permit to obtain a more accurate and detailed estimate of the market expectations in 
terms of a certain economic variable. For example, relative option prices can be used to 
determine implied probabilities of particular market outcomes, so that it would be possible to 
see not just the implied market forecast, but also the market’s view on each outcome. 
Arguably, the price at the macroeconomic derivatives markets would place more accuracy on 
economists’ forecasts and “consensus numbers would have more meaning” (Chow, 2002). 
Moreover, the implied forecast of the derivatives market would not be simply a better 
forecast; rather, it would represent an expression of risk, which would isolate and evaluate 
quantitatively the portion of the risk imbedded in other markets that are exposed and respond 
to macroeconomic factors. By supplying an additional, forward-looking measure of market 
expectations about the outcome of macroeconomic indicators, macroeconomic derivatives 
                                                 
10 See Tschulk (2004) for an example of using ISM Manufacturing options in a hedge fund strategy. 
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could contribute to a more efficient incorporation of macroeconomic fundamentals into 
prices. 
 
2.2 History of macroeconomic derivatives 
Macroeconomic derivatives have a history of both failure and success. This section examines 
unsuccessful attempts to create instruments that may be identified as predecessors of 
macroeconomic derivatives, analyzes the major obstacles to the introduction of such markets 
and provides examples of more successful cases of launching macroeconomic derivatives or 
products that bear some resemblance to them. 
2.2.1 Early attempts 
Even before macroeconomic derivatives were generally introduced in literature, academics 
and practitioners had started looking for opportunities to offer means of sharing certain 
previously untraded risks. The first two variables that naturally came into the focus were 
inflation and real estate prices. Initially, however, the attempts to develop markets to spread 
the risks associated with these two variables did not succeed. It may be argued whether 
contracts on inflation and real estate should be regarded as macroeconomic derivatives or, 
rather, derivatives on commodities. The underlying assets of these contracts, however, share 
some features with those of macroeconomic derivatives: they are highly illiquid and their 
prices are aggregate variables. Hence, the cases of creating markets for inflation and real 
estate futures are worth discussing here. 
Inflation Futures In academic literature, a futures market on inflation was first proposed by 
Lovell and Vogel (1973). They suggested that commodity futures markets might be naturally 
complemented by a CPI-futures market, which “would in a variety of ways help reduce the 
hardship created by uncertain future purchasing power”. The idea received support from the 
economists, since such market would allow hedging inflation risk directly, rather than through 
indirect inflation hedges used before (e.g. real estate, stocks, metals, etc.). Existence of CPI 
futures price would also permit converting nominal amounts into real ones (e.g. in debt 
contracts). Milton Friedman even suggested in 1986 that CPI futures could become the 
“largest-volume contract in the country” (cited from Schulz, 2000). However, due in part to 
Chapter 2 Macroeconomic Derivatives 2.2 History of macroeconomic derivatives 
 35
regulatory challenges, a practical experiment was not conducted until 1985. Later, the cause 
of CPI futures was promoted also by Petzel and Fabozzi (1986). 
The earliest attempt to create a functioning inflation futures market belongs to the Coffee, 
Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE), now part of New York Board of Trade. Already since 
1983 CSCE contemplated establishing a variety of index futures contracts, including contracts 
on consumer price index, corporate earnings, housing starts and new car sales. Only the 
futures on the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) 
were finally listed for trading in 1985. The settlement was carried out immediately after the 
data announcement 4 times a year – in January, April, July and October. Unfortunately, the 
experiment died as a result of lack of interest. In 1985 1,324 contracts were traded, and the 
next year the number increased to 8,776. In 1987, however, the market broke down, with only 
two contracts traded during the year. As a result, the CPI-W futures were subsequently de-
listed. 
According to practitioners, the main factor that contributed to the failure of this innovative 
instrument is that it appeared to be very much ahead of its time – at that moment even 
inflation-indexed securities were yet to be introduced. Moreover, no stable pricing 
relationship existed with other instruments. Finally, CPI futures appeared less appealing than 
commodities, such as gold (Srinivasan, 2004). 
Another explanation for the lack of interest is that the new market became a victim of the 
relatively stable prices. Indeed, the decline in oil prices significantly reduced the price 
volatility. An established market would have probably survived such a period, but the CPI-W 
futures market was not yet liquid enough, and the decline in volatility prevented the contract 
from developing (Shiller, 1993). 
In addition, Schulz (2000) provides the following explanations for the failure of the CPI 
futures market: 
· Alternative strategies: there existed other strategies to hedge against real income risk. 
· Design flaws: the volume of the CPI futures contract was too large for the average 
potential user; the time horizon of max. 3 years was too short. 
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· Psychological barriers: most people were still inexperienced with indexed financial 
instruments. 
To sum up, it appears that this early attempt to establish a macro market failed not because of 
its being unnecessary, but rather as an accident of history. In fact, Schulz (2000) tried to 
explore whether there are fundamental theoretical reasons why a CPI futures market could not 
succeed and failed to identify any. 
A market similar to a futures market for the consumer price index was also established in 
1987 in Brazil. The Brazilian futures were technically futures on the payouts of government 
obligations, but since their payout was indexed to the monthly CPI, the market practically 
represented a futures market on CPI itself. The experiment was ultimately terminated by the 
Brazilian government, which feared that the futures contracts on CPI promoted inflation, as 
suggested by a popular theory of the time (Shiller, 1993). 
In June 1997 the Chicago Board of Trade attempted to trade futures on Treasury Inflation 
Protected Securities (TIPS). While those contracts were not directly indexed on inflation 
(CPI), a price relationship with TIPS implied a de facto inflation futures contract. Only 22 
contracts were traded, all in 1997. Subsequently, the TIPS futures were de-listed. Again, the 
new contract appeared ahead of its time: the TIPS were only at its infancy. The inaugural 
TIPS issue was auctioned barely five months prior to the introduction of the futures, and the 
only outstanding issue was the ten-year TIPS. The market had yet limited participation, and 
the new futures effectively competed with TIPS for liquidity. Moreover, there was still 
uncertainty over fate of the TIPS program itself (Srinivasan, 2004). 
Real Estate  Futures Some researchers also proposed a futures market for real estate (Miller, 
1989 and Gemmil, 1990). In 1991, following these proposals, the London Futures and 
Options Exchange (London Fox) made an attempt to establish such a futures market, in order 
to make possible hedging, arbitrage and price discovery in real estate. The futures contracts 
were introduced on both single-family homes and commercial real estate. The residential 
contract was settled on a hedonic price index estimated on market prices of individual homes. 
The commercial contract settled on an index of appraised value, provided by Nationwide 
Anglia Building Society (NAHP index). Unfortunately, the contract traded for less than a 
year, since the trading volume was very low. The initiative also suffered from allegations that 
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the exchange tried to inflate the trading volume by reporting false trades. When the fraud was 
reported in the press, the futures market was closed. 
Again, in this case it appears that the collapse of the new market was caused by the alleged 
deceptive practices of the exchange’s management, but not by an aversion of market 
participants. The real estate futures did not trade long enough for the market participants to 
get into the market. Besides, at time of the launch the real estate market in the UK had a low 
turnover, prices were steadily falling, and there was little interest in this market in general, not 
to mention innovations. Patel (1994), in addition to the general problem of the absence of an 
arbitrage-pricing mechanism mentioned before, sees another reason for failure in the 
construction of NAHP index, which showed significant lag dependence over time. 
Consequently, the futures contract settling on this index did not provide an economic benefit 
from hedging. Furthermore, due to high transaction costs and time lags involved in operations 
with real estate, potential hedgers, according to Patel, would likely also bear time basis risk. 
A futures market in real estate has also been advocated by Case, Shiller and Weiss since 
1990.11 Their appeal was taken up by the Chicago Board of Trade, which in 1993 issued a 
press release stating that the Exchange had tentative plans to introduce futures on single-
family homes by city. The plans were abandoned, however, since exchange officials were 
discouraged by a survey that indicated only short interest. As another example, Enron 
Corporation, before it went bankrupt in 2001, also had had plans for developing a futures 
market for commercial real estate in the United States. 
2.2.2 More successful cases 
Despite of the failures described so far, macroeconomic derivatives found their way into 
existence, albeit sometimes only as embedded clauses. The growing anxiety about the 
riskiness of economic life might have pushed practitioners to seek opportunities to offer their 
clients new risk-management products. In addition, the increasing potency of information 
technology facilitated the development of new products in the field of derivatives. Although 
most of the cases in this subsection fall short of being full-scale markets for macroeconomic 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Case et al. (1993). 
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derivatives, they nevertheless demonstrate the path of innovation and the reaction of the 
market. The cases are reviewed in chronological order. 
First GDP-linked Sovereign Bonds Costa Rican debt was, perhaps, the first to carry value 
recovery payments pegged to the country's GDP, which in effect represented a 
(macroeconomic) warrant attached to the bonds. The May 1990 Brady Plan for Costa Rica 
contained a recapture clause conditional upon GDP, which gave the bond holders the right to 
receive higher interest payments on certain bonds if GDP exceeded 120% of the 1989 level in 
real terms. The threshold for the payments was exceeded in 1993. Facing the need to make 
additional payments, Costa Rica subsequently retired early a portion of the two of its Brady 
issues that were linked to GDP. Curiously, the existence of the warrant went largely unnoticed 
until a Bear Stearns analyst wrote about it in 1994. Moreover, Costa Rica appeared unaware 
that it needed to make the payments until Bear Stearns showed the bond trustee that Costa 
Rican GDP had reached the required targets (Bary, 1996). 
Bulgarian Discount Bonds In 1994, Citibank N.A., an investment bank, engineered a loan 
for Bulgaria with an interest rate tied to the country’s economic growth. Within a debt 
restructuring agreement with the London Club of private creditors, Bulgaria issued US$1,865 
million worth of Discount Bonds (so-called DISCs) maturing in 2024 with an innovative 
feature: Additional Interest Payments (AIPs). These AIPs were not warrants, detachable or 
otherwise, but they were equivalent to them in nature to an macroeconomic option. The AIP 
clause of the Bulgarian bond contracts stated an obligation of a supplemental interest payment 
for each year in which (1) Bulgaria’s gross domestic product surpassed 125% of its 1993 
level, and (2) there was a year-to-year increase in GDP (the year in which the threshold was 
reached was exempted from AIPs). For the years matching the two criteria, the semi-annual 
interest supplement was defined as one-half of that year’s GDP growth, with the actual 
payments scheduled to occur as soon as practically possible and to coincide with regular 
interest payment dates. 
Given the sharp decline of the Bulgarian GDP in the early 90s, the AIPs might be considered 
as a rather generous offer to the creditors during the restructuring talks.12 However, the clause 
                                                 
12 It may be also conjectured that the officials guessed that in times of good performance the country might be 
able to redeem early a significant portion of debt, as the bond was callable from July 2004, thus avoiding to pay 
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worked well for the issuer, since over the period when the bonds were outstanding the growth 
of the Bulgarian economy was relatively weak. AIPs effectively served for managing the 
economic risk for Bulgaria, reducing the cost of borrowing for the country in times of inferior 
performance of the economy. As to the benefit to the investors, an analyst suggested that “the 
Discount bonds may be attractive to investors most intrigued by the prospect of an 
uncorrelated emerging market asset possibly paying a GDP-linked bonus” (Segal, 2004). 
These expectations were not fulfilled, since no bonus was ever paid, as explained below. 
There were some practical issues with the design of the Bulgarian Discount Bonds. Given the 
normal technical lags and delays in data collection and calculation, as well as the coupon 
schedule, the supplemental payments could occur at the earliest seven months after the end of 
the calendar year of record. Potentially the lag could be as much as four years, which might 
be rather uncomfortable for the investors. Another serious problem was that the GDP 
indicator had not been clearly defined. According to the documentation, the figure for gross 
domestic product was to be taken from the publication of “the World Tables of the World 
Bank.” The publication itself, though, contained several different aggregates – in constant and 
current units, in US dollars and local currency. According to calculations performed by 
analysts before the bond redemption in 2004, interest arrears would have amounted to 
US$228 million if GDP had been calculated in local currency at current prices and US$51 
million if it had been calculated in dollars at current prices. At constant dollar prices the GDP 
threshold would have been crossed in 2003, and at constant leva prices it would have been 
exceeded only in 2005 (Batchelor, 2004). The financial community, apparently, assumed that 
the measure of GDP to be used was the one at constant prices in local currency, so no AIPs 
were actually executed before the outstanding amount of the issue was called in July 2004. 
Bosnian Warrants The Bulgarian example was taken up by Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
1997 commercial creditors agreed to write off all overdue interest and restructured the 
principal of the Bosnian debt owed to them into DM262 million 20-year discount bonds. The 
issue is divided into two parts. The second, or B, portion of the bonds is, in effect, a warrant 
on future economic performance and will be triggered if Bosnian gross domestic product per 
capita exceeds US$2,800 for two consecutive years before 2017. The reference value is 
                                                                                                                                                        
the AIPs on the repurchased bonds (Segal, 2004). In fact, parts of the issue were bought back by Bulgaria before 
the first call date and the rest called in July 2004. 
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considered GDP per capita in U.S. dollar terms measured in 1997 prices. The possibility of 
reaching the threshold was determined as extremely unlikely at the time of the restructuring 
agreement, as the GDP per capita at the end of 1997 was at only US$615, according to 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates (Chance, 2002). However, the 
probability of reaching the threshold has increased: in 2003 Bosnian GDP per capita reached 
US$1,822, while the threshold, adjusted for inflation, increased to about US$3,000 (IMF, 
2004a). For the purposes of this paper, it is also important to note that the Bosnia B warrant is 
actually trading separately of the A portion. 
Michelin The GDP-indexing features also appeared in corporate financing as well. In 2000 
Swiss Re New Markets and Société Générale arranged for Compagnie Financière Michelin 
(CFM), the Switzerland-based financial and holding arm of the Michelin tire group, a $1 
billion 12-year committed subordinated loan facility. The deal was not only the first combined 
bank and insurance capital facility, but also included an innovative feature. Under the terms of 
the transaction, CFM is guaranteed access to a bank credit facility for five years, i.e. up to 
2005, and the option to draw under certain conditions on an insurance facility for five years. 
The trigger event for the latter is a decline in the combined average annual GDP growth rate 
in Michelin’s principal markets (the euro zone and the US) below a certain level. This level is 
set at 1.5% in the first three years, and 2% in the last two years of the five-year option. The 
insurance trigger was structured into the deal because of the consideration that Michelin’s 
revenues are highly correlated to economic growth in its main markets, so that if GDP in 
these areas fell, the facility could provide an opportunity for restructuring (Schenk, 2000). 
Positions on Real Estate In London, two financial betting houses, City Index and IG Index, 
offered contracts for taking positions on house prices. City Index launched its Property 
Futures as early as October 2001. These futures provided the opportunity to take positions on 
variation in house prices, through contracts on the average house price for several regions, as 
well on certain specific property types for several London Boroughs. The Property Futures 
were based on the Residential Property Price Report published quarterly by HM Land 
Registry, which is based on actual house sales, as opposed to other indices that rely on real 
estate agent valuations and forecasts. The City Index's property futures, consequently, had 
maturities of 3 months, and were criticized for being too short-dated for many potential 
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homebuyers.13 However, the market appeared to be rather successful in the first year of its 
introduction, with open interest amounting to more than £2 million.14 At the moment, City 
Index does not enter any more in contracts on housing prices for undisclosed reasons. 
The other company, IG Index, started offering similar in nature Contracts for Difference 
(CFDs)15 on housing prices in 2002. The House Price CFDs allowed to take positions on the 
average house price for the overall UK market, for up to four quarters forward, as well as for 
twelve UK regions, including London, the most volatile and the most publicized housing 
market in the country. All contracts were settled against the Halifax House Price Survey 
released by HBOS. For the first 5 months after introduction, IG Index sold £20m worth of 
House Price contracts, with the majority of the buyers being hedging homeowners. IG Index 
had no other markets in which to hedge house price risk, so the imbalance of long and short 
interest forced one-year contracts to trade at a 10% to 15% discount to fair value (Polyn, 
2002). Currently, CFDs are offered through a subsidiary, IG Markets, but the company does 
not take trades on House Price CFDs, since its books are full. There is not a lot of movement 
in this sector, but the interest on the part of investors remains strong.16 
New Singapore Shares A rather close parallel to macro securities suggested by Shiller 
(1998) has been introduced in Singapore. Starting from November 2001, the Singaporean 
Government issued the so-called New Singapore Shares (NSS) to the total amount of S$2.7 
                                                 
13 “IC Asset Allocation - The Magic Rule Of Investing - Some People Might Need To Make Only One 
Investment Decision In Their Lifetime. Chris Dillow Explains”, Investors Chronicle, 18/01/2002 
14 “£2 million bet on house price collapse”, http://www.themovechannel.com/sitefeatures/news/2002-july/5d.asp, 
05/07/2002 
15 House Price CFDs were cash-settled futures contracts that gave investors exposure to changes in the housing 
market without all the effort of buying and selling property. They were leveraged products in the sense that they 
did not require putting up the full underlying contract value, with a low minimum margin requirement. CFDs 
were rather versatile: it was still possible to take long and short positions, so CFDs provided a convenient and 
inexpensive method of shorting the underlying index. For example, a short position in a House Price CFD might 
be used for hedging against the risk of a property portfolio dropping in value, whereas a long position could 
provide a protection from being priced out of the property market during the time of absence. The CFD markets 
in general also have some additional advantages, such an exemption from stamp duty (a levy imposed on the 
buyers of registered securities in the UK), risk protection (closure of positions at specified stop levels), very low 
limits on minimum trade sizes, and immediate dealing. 
16 Based on information provided by IG Markets in late January 2005. 
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billion and distributed them to 2.04 million eligible citizens, who received between S$200 and 
S$1,700 worth of NSS. The shares have a guaranteed minimum dividend rate of 3% per 
annum. Every year NSS also pay an extra dividend equal to the real GDP growth rate (if 
positive) of the previous calendar year. On 1 March 2007, all outstanding shares will be 
automatically exchanged for cash at $1 each, but the holders can also redeem them before 
maturity. 
The NSS’s were distributed to the lower-income citizens (mostly the elderly and less 
educated) in an attempt to reduce income disparities, but the GDP option was supposedly 
designed to give these citizens a feeling of participation in the economic success, if any, 
thereby encouraging greater commitment and involvement in the local economy. While from 
this social security point of view the scheme may be considered very appealing, it appears to 
be inferior from a risk-management perspective. The NSS are not tradable and thus cannot be 
sold to foreigners, so the aggregate macroeconomic risk remains undiversified. Furthermore, 
the NSS’s do not reveal any price on a claim on national income. 
To help Singaporeans cope with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) increase between January 
2003 and January 2004, the Government also issued Economic Restructuring Shares (ERS). 
The ERS is part of an offset package that, according to the Singaporean Government, is 
enough to cover the increase in GST that most households will have to pay for at least 5 
years. The first lot of ERS was issued in early 2003, the second – in early 2004 and the third 
is to be issued in early 2005. ERS earn tax-free dividends each year in the form of bonus 
shares, payable every year on March 1st from 2004 to 2008. The rate is similar to that of the 
NSS’s: a guaranteed minimum of 3% + real GDP growth rate of the previous year. 
2.2.3 Major practical obstacles 
The history reviewed in the preceding subsections highlights some of the barriers that 
hindered the development of macroeconomic derivative markets. Besides the theoretical 
issues outlined in the beginning of the chapter, the reviewed cases reveal the practical and 
institutional issues facing macroeconomic derivatives. In addition, Borensztein and Mauro 
(2004) and Shiller (2003, 2004) suggested a number of other market failures that may hinder 
beneficial financial innovation in general, and may be also relevant for the case of 
macroeconomic derivatives, even though it is not always directly evident from the cases 
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above. The list of possible challenges to the introduction of macroeconomic derivatives 
includes the following: 
· Liquidity: A major problem encountered in introducing macroeconomic derivatives to the 
market was the one of achieving sufficient liquidity. Practically, it was very difficult to 
build volume. New and/or complex instruments tend to be illiquid, and pricing them 
involves computational costs, so it is easy to understand why investors generally tend to 
react not very enthusiastically to financial innovation ideas. For a new market to be 
successful, a certain ‘critical mass’ must be achieved. It requires a concerted effort, which 
would help guarantee market liquidity and spread computational costs over a large market 
capitalization for the new instruments. 
· Measurement and Misrepresentation Problems: How well an index or an indicator 
tracks the economic phenomena it is supposed to measure is often debatable. In fact, 
measuring macroeconomic variables involves some subjectivity. At any given time there 
may exist two or more different estimates for similar variables. Another problem is that in 
certain cases governments may have a substantial degree of control over macroeconomic 
statistics, even though statistical agencies in many countries are independent. This is 
especially a problem for GDP-linked securities: when repayments are linked to economic 
indicators produced by the debtor country, the authorities might be tempted to tamper with 
the presentation of those indicators. Moreover, even for advanced countries, initial data 
releases may be subject to substantial revisions. Investors might perceive potential data 
revisions as an additional unwelcome source of uncertainty. Finally, economic data 
typically becomes available with significant lags, which also may be uncomfortable for 
investors. 
· Suitability of Indices: Another problem highlighted by the reviewed cases is that of the 
appropriateness of the economic data and indices used to settle macroeconomic 
derivatives. For a functioning derivatives market, it is critical that the indices represent the 
value associated with a standard claim on future income or services. The standardization in 
indices used in contract settlement is, in fact, essential to the liquidity in the new derivative 
markets. In this sense it would be reasonable to use widely available economic indicators 
and indices for contract settlement. The available historical data and public familiarity with 
such indicators may, indeed, favor the acceptance of the new derivatives. However, there is 
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a potential pitfall in existing variables and indices: they may be not directly suitable for 
risk-management purposes, and in this case the basis risk will not be completely 
eliminated. To provide a simple example, the modern technique used to construct a 
consumer price index may make it sufficiently representative of the price dynamics in an 
economy. However, for a single agent, e.g. an enterprise, the price dynamics of its inputs 
can be rather different from that of the widely accepted CPI measure. A derivative settled 
on this basis, thus, will be not very useful for the hedging needs of this particular agent. In 
a similar argument, Shiller (2003) contends that new, special indices should be designed 
for using with macroeconomic derivatives, so that these contracts are settled based on a 
variable that closely reflects the exposure being hedged. 
· Product Uncertainty: It appears that market participants do need some time to get 
familiar with new products. When a new financial instrument is introduced, investors may 
be uncertain about exactly what they are buying. Therefore, they will demand a premium, 
which, in turn, may deter issuers from issuing the new instrument in the first place. It 
appears that investors need to be educated and informed about the characteristics and uses 
of the new products, but in most cases described above an extensive information campaign 
was absent. 
· Reluctance of Market Makers: It is often said that futures markets succeed only if there 
are professional dealers willing to stock an inventory in the security traded. The financial 
intermediaries, however, have been reluctant to make markets for macroeconomic 
derivatives since the return on risk capital for making markets has been insufficient, while 
the risk that would have to be assumed by the financial institution might be significant 
(GS/DB, 2002). The absence of a tradable underlying asset also makes it difficult for the 
market makers to cover their positions. Another related obstacle might lie in the highly 
competitive structure of financial markets. In introducing a new type of financial 
instrument, a private financial institution incurs ‘first-mover’ costs. However, it may be 
unable to maintain a monopoly over the new market: patents are rarely (though 
increasingly) used for financial instruments and imitation is quite easy. Thus, the 
institution may be unable to rip the benefits of its innovation, which reduces the incentive 
to develop the instrument in the first place, even though the social benefit of the innovation 
may be high. 
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· Coordination Problems: While investors need time to learn to price the new financial 
instruments, they may also need a large number of issuers that offer the new instruments in 
order to be able to diversify risk. An individual issuer may teach investors to price its own 
instrument and thus help them to learn to price those issued by others, but an issuer is 
unlikely to take this into account ex ante. Nor a private issuer, unless it is a not-for-profit 
organization, will consider the social benefit of the new risk-sharing opportunities provided 
by the new instrument. Thus, when all other issuers are offering standard instruments, each 
individual issuer is likely to continue using standard securities. 
· Institutional Rigidity: An explanation related to the previous one is offered by Shiller 
(1993). He argues that innovation in derivatives markets has been held back by the 
institutional rigidity that favors maintaining status quo. Insurance, banks, and investment 
companies may be slow to introduce new products because of separation of control over 
their actions. There are three groups that guide the operations of the organization: its 
management, clients, and government regulators. The management is responsible for the 
day-to-day business, but influenced by the two other groups. If the clients themselves are 
again companies, governments or even the general public, it is sometimes difficult to 
explain the qualities of new or improved instruments to non-professionals. It also may take 
considerable time to convince regulators of the importance of some financial innovations. 
· Need for Standardization: A liquid secondary market where investors can easily 
diversify their portfolio requires that the traded instruments have identical features for all 
issuers. Moreover, for contingent claims it is crucial to have unambiguous and verifiable 
standards that describe the event on which the claim is contingent. The standardization 
process for macroeconomic derivatives, however, has not yet begun, and in some cases the 
design of new securities leaves considerable room for interpretation of trigger events (e.g. 
in the early GDP-linked securities). 
The importance of the described obstacles for the case of GDP-linked securities was assessed 
by IMF researchers through a systematic survey of market participants conducted in 
collaboration with the Emerging Markets Traders Association (EMTA) and the Emerging 
Markets Creditors Association (EMCA). Respondents of the survey identified liquidity and 
the potential for mismeasurement of GDP as the key obstacles to the use of growth-linked 
instruments (IMF, 2004b). 
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To sum up, the review of the historical experience leads to a conclusion that there are 
substantial obstacles to the introduction of macroeconomic derivatives. However, an absence 
of a financial instrument says little – positive or negative – about its desirability and 
feasibility. Due to coordination and design issues financial innovation in practice appears to 
be a rather unsystematic process. New financial instruments do not seem to result from a 
systematic search for optimal risk sharing, or a gradual evolution leading to superior forms of 
finance. Instead, failures or successes of new instruments appear to be accidents of history, 
due to a particular combination of circumstances. 
The situation with financial innovation, and with macroeconomic derivatives in particular, 
might be similar to that of multiple equilibria. Theoretically, macroeconomic derivatives seem 
useful, and the reviewed history may indicate that the market is potentially interested in them. 
However, a move to the new equilibrium with these new instruments may require additional 
experimentation, efforts to find the precise financial structure that will perform well, and 
efforts to educate the potential clients about the new risk management tool.17 In many cases, 
financial innovation also requires strong intervention on the part of policy-makers and 
academics in order to make a variety of changes needed to make the innovation work, or 
commitment by individuals willing to take unusually large risks. Often-quoted examples of 
such official or individual involvement include the role of the government in establishing the 
market for mortgage-backed securities in the United States, and the personal role of Michael 
Milken in creating the market for junk bonds. 
 
2.3 Current state 
To extend further the analysis of the cases of financial innovation involving macroeconomic 
derivatives – or similar instruments – of various characteristics and success, this section 
proceeds to describe currently operating markets for macroeconomic derivatives, which may 
                                                 
17 Bettzüge and Hens (2001), using an evolutionary finance approach, also find theoretical support to the 
empirical observations that the success of a financial innovation, as a mutation, depends on a sufficiently high 
trading volume, marketing, and new and differentiated hedging opportunities. 
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have managed to overcome some of the challenges described above. The most known of these 
cases is the Economic Derivatives market created by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, 
which trades options and forwards on economic data releases. Some of the newer 
developments are also reviewed. 
2.3.1 Economic Derivatives 
A first report mentioning a new market for the previously untraded macroeconomic risks 
appeared in October 2001 in the Futures and Options Week18. The report informed that two 
banks, JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank were working on creating a market for derivatives on 
economic data releases in the US and Europe. The author suggested an enormous potential of 
the new derivatives: "The use of these products could expand in ways that can't be predicted 
right now" (quoted from Schweimeyer, 2003). The market was indeed started a year later by 
Deutsche Bank in cooperation with Goldman Sachs, as JP Morgan backed away from the 
project. The new products offered by the consortium were called “Economic Derivatives”. 
The Economic Derivatives market allows its participants to buy and sell call and put options, 
both vanilla and digital, as well as forward contracts, on a certain forthcoming economic 
release. To satisfy most of the participants’ demand, multiple strike prices are offered, e.g. in 
the range of 2 to 2.5 standard deviation of the potential outcomes of the data release. 
Derivatives are bought and sold in universal Dutch auctions19 held on specific dates prior to 
the data release, and then settled according to the release. Thus, the Economic Derivatives 
market is not an exchange-like market – it is rather an auction market for over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, which is only open during specific periods of time (usually one hour). 
Moreover, trades are booked and settled using standard documentation for OTC derivatives, 
which may have helped to foster acceptance of the new derivatives among the financial 
community. 
                                                 
18 See Topping (2001). 
19 “Dutch auction” here means a uniform-price auction, whereby securities are allocated to the highest bidders 
until the total amount of securities on offer is covered. All successful bidders pay the price quoted by the lowest 
bidder (the clearing price). 
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Box 2.1 An Auction Example 
Terms:  Sample order:  
Event: ISM Manufacturing PMI Order type: Buy vanilla call 
Release Date: 1st February 2005 Strike price: 55 
Auction Date: 1st February 2005 Order size: $50,000/tick 
Auction Time: 08:00-09:00 NY time Limit price: $2 
Strikes: 53 to 61 in 0.5 increments Results:  
Tick size: Percentage points Implied market forecast: 56.793 
  Price of a vanilla call with strike 55 $1.98643 
  Settlement value: 56.4 
If a participant enters an order to buy a call option with a strike price of 55 and a limit price of $2, his/her 
order will be fully filled, and the participant pays 50,000x1.98643 = 99,321.5 in premium. At expiration, 
the option pays 50,000 x [56.4 – 55] x 100 = 7,000,000. 
Source: http://www.gs.com/econderivs/, Yahoo Briefing Economic Calendar (http://biz.yahoo.com/c/e.html) 
 
Three basic types of instruments are offered on the Economic Derivatives market, with payoff 
profiles in conformity with market conventions (payoffs are illustrated in Fig. 2.2): 
· Range forwards: essentially single-strike risk reversals, in which the strike is the implied 
market forecast; have zero upfront premium and provide a simple way to go short or long 
in an economic data release; payouts are capped at the lowest and highest strike 
boundaries; 
· Vanilla options: calls pay a fixed amount per tick that the outcome is above strike, puts 
pay a fixed amount per tick that the outcome is below strike; call options are capped at the 
highest strike available (puts at the lowest); vanilla spread options with caps closer to the 
strike are also available; 
· Digital (binary) options: calls pay a fixed amount if the outcome is equal to or above 
strike, puts pay a fixed amount if the outcome is below strike; digital ranges are also 
available. 
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Figure 2.2 Basic types of Economic Derivatives 
Source: http://www.gs.com/econderivs/ 
The first auctions took place in US non-farm payrolls. Soon after, several new releases were 
added – monthly manufacturing figures from the Institute of Supply Management, and US 
retail sales (excluding automobiles)20. The market received the new derivatives quite well: the 
interest exceeded the expectations of the launching consortium, with payroll being the most 
liquid section (Cass, 2003). 
In May 2003, following requests from European clients interested in hedging risk for both 
inflation swaps and inflation-indexed government bonds, the sponsoring banks started 
offering one- and three-month options on Eurozone harmonized index of consumer prices 
(excluding tobacco)21. In February 2004 auctions on US Initial Unemployment Claims were 
launched, reflecting a demand from fixed income traders, who generally pay close attention to 
the labor market. In January 2005 the set of Economic Derivatives was expanded to include 
U.S. gross domestic product (quarterly release). Additionally, in February 2005 the 
consortium launched auctions for derivatives on the U.S. international trade balance report 
(monthly release). Table 2.2 summarizes the economic data releases currently included in the 
set of auctions. In future, the sponsoring banks plan to introduce auctions on a US inflation 
measure, as well as to extend the family of Economic Derivatives to include more non-US 
measures, including GDP figures. 
                                                 
20 The Retail Sales auctions were discontinued in February 2004 and reinstated in September of the same year. 
21 Later only 1- and 2-month options. 
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Table 2.2 Statistics currently included in the Economic Derivatives auctions 
Statistic Reporting Agency Frequency of 
Release 
Frequency of 
Auctions 
US Nonfarm Payroll Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
monthly 2 every month 
(1 day before & on 
the day of release) 
US Manufacturing PMI Institute of Supply 
Management 
monthly monthly 
(on the day of the 
release) 
US Retail Sales (excl. autos) Census Bureau of the 
Department of 
Commerce 
monthly monthly 
(on the day of the 
release) 
Eurozone HICP 
(excl. tobacco) 
European Central Bank monthly monthly 
(1 & 2 months before 
the release) 
US Initial Unemployment 
Claims 
Employment & Training 
Administration, 
Department of Labor 
weekly weekly 
(on the day of the 
release) 
US GDP Census Bureau of the 
Department of 
Commerce 
quarterly monthly 
(on the days of 
advance, preliminary 
& actual release) 
US International Trade 
Balance 
Census Bureau and the 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the 
Department of 
Commerce 
monthly monthly 
(on the day of the 
release) 
 
One of the main concerns expressed by the potential users before economic derivatives were 
launched had been that of liquidity.22 The fact that the new market was developed in a 
consortium, thus, might have been crucial to its success: the two large financial institutions 
brought together their respective fixed income, equity and foreign exchange clients in order to 
generate liquidity, rather than focusing on economic statistics in separate regions. All orders 
regardless of the source are combined into one pool during specific, discrete auction periods, 
thereby building liquidity (see Fig. 2.3). Moreover, the two banks showed considerable 
commitment to launching the new derivatives thoroughly by creating market awareness and 
educating the clients about the new product. In May 2003 ICAP, the world’s largest inter-
dealer broker, began offering economic derivatives to its clients, introducing Economic 
Derivatives to the interbank market as well. As a result, the Economic Derivatives market has 
                                                 
22 The other concern is the adequacy of underlying data. This concern has not been explicitly addressed by the 
sponsoring banks. See subsection 3.1.4 for a discussion for the case of GDP derivatives. 
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consistently tripled year-over-year since inception23 and currently is the most liquid market 
for direct trading of economic data releases. 
 
Figure 2.3 Economic Derivatives liquidity pool 
Source: GS/DB, 2004 
Parimutuel System An even more critical element of the Economic Derivatives market is the 
Parimutuel Digital Call Auction (PDCA) technology, on which it is based on. The PDCA 
technology (dubbed as the “universal Dutch auction” by Goldman Sachs) was developed by 
US financial technology firm Longitude, Inc., which introduced parimutuel principles to the 
derivatives market.24 
Parimutuel systems are extensively used in wagering on sports events. In a parimutuel 
mechanism, customers typically place bets during a specific period before the event. After the 
betting period ends, customers receive the odds on their wager, which are then used to 
determine the payout to successful bettors after the event has ended. The intermediary 
collecting the wagers does not take any risk associated with the outcome of the event. The 
odds are determined such that the total premium paid equals the payouts – effectively, the 
losing wagers fund all the winning wagers. Thus, the parimutuel system can be described as 
“self-hedging”. 
The PDCA technology applies the parimutuel mechanism to financial markets, but with 
several necessary modifications, listed below. 
                                                 
23 “Goldman, et al Launch Auctions”, Wall Street Letter, 28/01/05 
24 Besides Economic Derivatives, the PDCA technology was used to create mortgage prepayment derivatives, 
launched in June 2003 by Goldman Sachs in partnership with ICAP, and options on crude oil inventory statistics, 
launched by the New York Mercantile Exchange, Goldman Sachs and ICAP in October 2004. 
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· The parimutuel system, which typically allows trading of only binary options, was 
extended in the PDCA to include also vanilla call and put options and spreads. 
· Customers in a PDCA auction submit limit orders, while in a conventional wagering 
system customers usually do not have any control over the price they pay for claims. 
· The PDCA technology permits participants to submit both buy and sell orders, as opposed 
to only buy orders in parimutuel wagering systems. 
· Instead of specifying a fixed amount of premium to pay, with subsequent payout subject to 
uncertainty, in a PDCA auction participants request a specific number of contracts, and the 
price they obtain remains uncertain until the end of the auction. 
A critical feature of PDCA auctions is that they effectively optimize liquidity. Each order at 
the auction is executed in combination with parts of other executed orders – the so-called 
“many-to-many matching”. It cancels the need for finding discrete order matches and removes 
the constraints imposed by the traditional market-making system. Traditionally, derivatives 
markets rely on standard order-matching techniques. For each buy order the market-maker 
searches for a corresponding sell order of the same type of instrument, with the same price 
and quantity. In case of a large order flow, liquidity is usually sufficient and transactions are 
frequent. Otherwise, traditional market-making may involve order mismatches. A financial 
intermediary typically allocates capital for such mismatches, and attempts to use the 
underlying instrument to facilitate order matches in the derivatives market for its customers. 
However, when there is no tradable underlying, order matching becomes difficult. 
The PDCA technology eliminates the requirement for making markets. It aggregates liquidity 
across different instruments and strikes into a single pool. For a transaction to be executed, a 
discrete order match is not required. Because orders are matched “many-to-many”, each order 
can provide liquidity for other orders, even though the latter might be for different 
instruments. A PDCA auction is able operate even with option buyers only. A tradable 
underlying instrument is not required to create a liquid derivatives market. Moreover, at a 
PDCA auction the prices are based on relative supply and demand of all participants and are 
determined so that as much order interest is cleared as possible. 
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Parimutuel pricing also helps to reduce the product uncertainty problem. As mentioned in 
subsection 2.2.3, investors are often reluctant to get involved in a new market until they 
develop an understanding of fair pricing and liquidity. In a PDCA auction prices are market-
driven and determined by customer participation, rather than by some model or subjective 
assessment of the price of risk. Customers receive a price for a derivative based on underlying 
risk that reflects the consensus view of all participants in the auction. Prices in the auction are 
based on commitment of capital by all participants and are not set by an individual market-
maker, so that a fair and level playing field is created. Moreover, the PDCA auctions are very 
transparent: indicative prices, implied volatilities and probabilities are broadcast in real time 
during the auction period. 
 
Figure 2.4 Comparison of traditional order matchi ng and PDCA auction 
Source: http://www.longitude.com/html/pdca_technology.html 
The price tends to improve automatically with new orders: most orders have a positive effect 
on the pricing of other orders in the auction. If the demand for a particular contract increases, 
auction participants bid up its price, and the other derivatives being auctioned become 
relatively cheaper. For example, suppose an order that has a view on the data release below 
the current market expected value is entered in the system. This order makes other orders at 
the center of the implied distribution relatively cheaper, and those at the left tail – relatively 
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more expensive (Fig. 2.5). This order improves the price of the orders with dissimilar views 
(acting as supply) and raises the price of the orders with similar views (acting as demand). 
New participants entering the auction continuously influence the order in a positive way, and 
at the end of the auction it gets filled at a better price than initially. 
   
At the beginning of the auction After the order is entered At the close of the auction 
Figure 2.5 Price improvement at a PDCA auction 
Source: GS/DB, 2004 
Technically, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank act as counterparties on the option contracts. 
However, their exposure may be virtually zero. In a parimutuel auction, all derivatives that 
settle in-the-money are funded by those that settle out-of-the-money, so that the system is risk 
neutral, or self-hedging. The sponsoring banks derive their profit from charging an execution 
fee, as well as from proprietary trading. 
Having the above benefits, the PDCA technology indeed represents an interesting innovation 
and merits a more detailed description of its mechanics.25 A PDCA option is conducted by a 
‘sponsor’ (a financial intermediary). The sponsor selects an underlying variable U, and holds 
the auction sometime before the value of U becomes known. Depending on the range of the 
likely outcomes of U, the sponsor also determines the strike prices k1, k2, ..., kS – 1, where k1 < 
k2 < ... < kS – 1, for the derivatives to be traded on the underlying. The S – 1 strikes divide the 
outcomes of U into S states, and each state is assigned a ‘fundamental’ state-contingent claim 
(an Arrow-Debreu security). For example, the state S = 1, associated with the outcome U < k1, 
has a digital put option with a strike k1 as a state-contingent claim. The second state-
contingent claim is a digital range with strikes of k1 and k2, which pays out a fixed amount if 
k1 = U < k2. The state S (outcome U = kS – 1) is associated with a digital call struck at kS – 1. 
Then, at the start of the auction, the sponsor is required to enter (small) opening orders ?s for 
                                                 
25 The mathematics of the PDCA technology is described in Baron and Lange (2003) and in Baron (2004). 
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all state-contingent claims, thus taking only very limited exposure to the underlying. During 
the auction the participants submit orders j = 1,2, ..., J, requesting a specific number of 
contracts nj and the limit price wj that they are willing to pay or receive. 
To determine the PDCA equilibrium, all derivatives ordered are first replicated with state-
contingent claims by determining notional amounts aj,s of each state-contingent claim s for 
every order j, i.e. replication weights of state-contingent claims, which must be non-negative. 
For example, in case of a buy order for a digital call with strike kv that pays a fixed amount if 
at expiry U = kv, the replication weights are determined as follows: 
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This set of state-contingent claims will have the same payout as the digital call. If there is an 
buy order for a vanilla call spread with strikes kv and kw, it can be replicated with the 
following weights: 
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In this case the replication weights are based on conditional expected value of the underlying. 
The equilibrium price ps of the state-contingent claim s in PDCA auctions is assumed to be 
non-negative. Prices of all state-contingent claims add up to unity, and may be also 
interpreted as implied probabilities of respective states. The equilibrium price pj of a 
derivative requested in order j is then determined as:26 
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Since the equilibrium price pj of the derivative may not necessarily equal the limit price wj of 
the order j, the number of filled contracts xj for the order is calculated according the following 
logic (for a buy order): 
                                                 
26 It is assumed here that the sponsor does not charge fees. 
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The total premium M paid in the auction is defined as the sum of the premiums paid by the 
participants plus the sum of the opening orders: 
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The total payout to participants ys is defined as: 
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To make the system self-hedging, the PDCA imposes the following condition, which is the 
cornerstone of the system: 
 M
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 for all s = 1,2,...,S. (2.11) 
Thus, the amount needed to settle all the filled requests for every state must be equal to the 
total amount of premium collected. The relative prices of the contingent claims are also set 
equal to the relative amount of cleared premium ms for those contingent claims, i.e. for any 
two state-contingent claims: 
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Finally, the total premium M is maximized subject to all constraints described above. The 
resulting solution provides the unique equilibrium, which determines the no-arbitrage prices 
of derivatives in the auction. PDCA effectively aggregates liquidity across all derivatives 
without necessarily matching buy orders with sell orders. In fact, PDCA can clear significant 
volume without any sell orders. 
Applications The Economic Derivatives are marketed by the sponsoring banks as a tool to 
hedge risks associated with data release shocks, as well as a way to take speculative positions. 
Chapter 2 Macroeconomic Derivatives 2.3 Current state 
 57
According to reports by Goldman Sachs, most of the participants have been using the new 
products as a hedge (Cass, 2003). 
Market players exposed to risk associated with economic data releases clearly benefit from 
Economic Derivatives. Before the introduction of the new instrument they had been already 
hedging against adverse data release shocks through other financial products, which usually 
did not provide a perfect hedge. Economic Derivatives offered these market players a much 
more precise instrument. For example, a trader running a short equity book or a strategy based 
on monetary easing can hedge against a sharp increase in non-farm employment, which may 
cause the Treasury securities to fall in price, by buying a call option on the non-farm payrolls 
auction.27 If the actual number turns out to be higher than the strike of the option, its payout 
will cover, at least partially, the loss on the bond portfolio. Another example is the HIPC 
derivatives, which are used to hedge exposure to inflation-linked swaps and government 
securities. The recently introduced GDP auctions may also appeal to the corporations looking 
for a hedge against the risks associated with the economy. 
Some economists and market participants, however, labeled the project as entirely speculative 
and similar to a casino game. According to one economist, the Economic Derivatives market 
“seems to be like betting black or red on the roulette table” (Chow, 2002). This point of view 
may have its merits, especially for certain statistics that are very volatile, such as weekly 
unemployment claims. Some practitioners also claimed that Economic Derivatives would 
make poor hedges unless they can be tightly linked to a position, as in the case of interest rate 
swaps (Thind, 2002). 
Nevertheless, as contracts on information events, Economic Derivatives have proved useful. It 
is observed that the releases of scheduled macroeconomic announcements have an immediate 
influence on financial markets. For example, the highest price volatility in the US Treasury 
market is typically found in intervals of just a few minutes around these announcements, 
reflecting a market reaction to a surprise (Gadanecz, 2003). In the past, speculators could take 
                                                 
27 A positive surprise in a macroeconomic indicator would, in theory, increase the market’s expectation of future 
monetary tightening and lead to an immediate fall in Treasury prices. This negative correlation between 
announcement surprises and price movements was found to be especially strong for non-farm payrolls, but 
Furfine (2001) discovered cases when the direction of the price change in response to employment surprises was 
inconsistent. 
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a position only on the direction of the surprise, i.e. whether the actual number exceeds or falls 
short of the expectations, by taking positions in Treasury securities. Economic Derivatives 
provided speculators with a tool for taking positions precisely on the quantitative outcome of 
the event. 
An obstacle to a wider application of Economic Derivatives as a hedging tool lies in the 
design of most auctions, which makes the instruments traded very short-dated, as can be 
inferred from Table 2.2. At the exception of HIPC auctions, Economic Derivatives are traded 
just before the release, so the contracts themselves have maturity of only half an hour or so. 
Such very short-term instruments can be still used to hedge the shocks from the data releases, 
but following longer-term trends would require participating consistently from auction to 
auction. Technically, however, there are no barriers to extending the maturity of Economic 
Derivatives, so that they can be used more widely in hedging. 
Economic derivatives have fulfilled well the third function of macroeconomic derivatives – 
that of revealing the market expectation of the outcomes of a particular economic variable. 
The market in general watches closely the results of the auctions, and the forecasts of the 
most important data releases implied by the auctions are reported by financial news services. 
As Figure 2.6 demonstrates, over the past two years the forecasts implied by the auctions have 
been fairly consistent with the consensus forecast of the Wall Street economists surveyed by 
Reuters, with a correlation coefficient between these two numbers of 0.967 (see Appendix for 
data and correlations for various auctions). 
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Figure 2.6 Implied market forecasts at US non-farm payrolls auctions 
Source: Reuters News , http://www.icapeconderivatives.com, Yahoo Briefing Economic Calendar (http://biz.yahoo.com/c/e.html) 
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It is important to note that the implied market forecasts are based on the probabilities of the 
various outcomes of a macroeconomic data release calculated during the auction. Since these 
probabilities are attached by the market under the no-arbitrage condition imposed by the 
design of the PDCA system, they are risk-neutral probabilities, which incorporate risk premia. 
Hence, an outcome to which the auction participants are averse will be assigned a higher 
implied probability, relative to the objective probability. The distribution of economists’ 
forecasts, on the other hand, are based on empirical probabilities, so the market forecast 
implied by an Economic Derivatives auction and the economists’ consensus should, in theory, 
somewhat differ (Gadanecz, 2003). 
2.3.2 Other developments 
Although being of smaller scale and potential than previous example, a number of other 
developments in the field of macroeconomic derivatives are worth mentioning as well. This 
subsection reviews the cases of CPI futures traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME), house price warrants issued by Goldman Sachs in the UK, and retail online 
exchanges. 
CPI futures at CME In February 2004 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, despite previous 
unsuccessful attempts (described in subsection 2.2.1), launched a new CPI futures market. 
CME reasoned that derivatives on economic statistics would be a useful tool for investors, 
since economic indicators do move markets. Among different economic variables, Consumer 
Price Index was deemed to be most likely to succeed as a reference index for a futures 
contract. Many investors at the time were concerned about a possible rise in inflation in the 
immediate future (Srinivasan, 2004).28 In a survey of inflation-indexed Treasury securities 
and the broader inflation-protected fixed-income securities markets, conducted in autumn 
2003 by the Bond Market Association, 71.7 percent of the respondents indicated that they 
would utilize a futures contract based on the U.S. CPI. Moreover, about two-thirds of the 
respondents supported the idea that the introduction of an inflation futures market would 
increase corporate issuance of inflation-linked debt.29 
                                                 
28 In fact, in 2004 the CPI did experience the biggest increase in four years – by 3.3 percent (Guo and Kliesen, 
2005). 
29 “TIPS Survey”, Bond Market Association, December 2003, available at http://www.bondmarkets.com. 
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Having registered an interest in inflation futures from market participants, CME reviewed the 
failed attempts to create such markets at CSCE and CBOT, but decided that the obstacles, 
which hampered these previous efforts, subsided. First, inflation-linked securities in general 
gained acceptance amongst investors. TIPS had been rapidly growing since their introduction 
in 1997, and evolved into an asset class broadly distributed across a large number of 
investors. Second, there was an expanding over-the-counter dollar-denominated inflation-
indexed derivative market, which stimulated demand for a standardized exchange-traded 
product that could benefit the dealers in these customized risk-management tools. Finally, the 
pricing of the new futures was better understood by the market participants: a liquid market in 
TIPS permitted arbitrage between the inflation-linked Treasury securities, nominal Treasury 
securities and CPI derivatives. 
CME’s strategy was to mimic the relationship existing between Eurodollar futures and 
Interest Rate Swaps. The exchange launched a series of 3-month inflation futures, which 
would serve as hedging instruments for TIPS and as building blocks for inflation swaps. By 
being multi-purpose CPI futures do not enter in a direct competition with TIPS (which was 
another obstacle to previous attempts), but rather complement them. CPI futures were 
designed to expand the market by attracting new players and by allowing new applications, 
such as term REPOs in TIPS (on real rates) and synthetic inflation-indexed corporate bonds. 
By their nature CME CPI futures are quite simple and resemble the 3-month Eurodollar 
futures. However, CME CPI Futures are backward-looking contracts (unlike Eurodollar 
futures). The CPI futures contract represents the inflation accretion on a notional value of 
$1,000,000 for a period of three calendar months, implied by the Consumer Price Index – 
U.S. city average for all urban consumers, all items, not seasonally adjusted (CPI-U), as 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.30 For example, the Reference CPI Futures Index 
for the June 2004 contract is computed using the annualized percentage change from the 
CPI-U for February 2004 (released in March 2004) to CPI-U for May 2004 (released in June 
2004). If the CPI-U for February and May 2004 are 184.4 and 185.4 respectively, the 
reference index for the June 2004 contract will be: 31 
                                                 
30 I.e. the same index as utilized in TIPS. 
31 Example taken from Srinivasan (2004). 
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The CPI futures are cash settled and traded through CME’s GLOBEX electronic trading 
platform. The market has a designated lead market maker, who provides liquidity and 
automated two-sided price quotes. Initially, 12 consecutive March quarterly contracts were 
launched, with settlement months from March 04 through to December 06, so that the CPI 
futures could bridge the gap to TIPS maturing in January 2007. Strips of contracts can also be 
traded. 
The Exchange envisions that the CPI futures can be used in the following ways:32 
· Investors TIPS can acquire long positions in CPI futures in order to isolate nominal interest 
rates in these products. 
· TIPS holders can use CPI Futures to hedge short-term inflation risk, including the inflation 
risk in the accretion of TIPS principal, which arises due to the three-month delay in the 
accretion. 
· CPI futures can be combined with Treasury futures contracts traded at CBOT to create 
“synthetic TIPS”, e.g. for arbitrage purposes. 
· Portfolio managers and pension funds with substantial positions in regular nominal 
corporate debt issues or conventional U.S. Treasury notes can create synthetic inflation-
indexed securities by combining a short position in the CPI futures with a portion of their 
long cash positions, thereby isolating the real rates. Similarly, CPI futures can be used with 
inflation-linked securities to isolate nominal interest rates. 
· Arbitrageurs can trade strips of consecutive quarterly CPI Futures expirations against strips 
of 3-month Eurodollar futures (a CPI Eurodollar spread) in order to express position on 
forward real rates. 
                                                 
32 According to the CME CPI Futures brochure, 8/12/2003, available at http://www.cme.com/cpi. 
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· With a strip of consecutive contract months, users can also hedge longer-term inflation 
risk. In particular, OTC swap dealers can price inflation swaps based on strips of CPI 
futures and hedge their risks with it. 
· Traders in the OTC U.S. dollar inflation-indexed swap market can buy CPI futures as a 
hedge if they are “receiving inflation” in a swap or, conversely, sell CPI futures if they are 
“paying inflation” in a swap. 
· In addition to using the CPI strip for long term swaps, holders of short TIPS can hedge out 
the exposure to a particular CPI release. 
The prices of CPI futures capture market expectations of future inflation and the associated 
risk premium. Assuming that the latter is negligible, another potential use of the CPI futures 
contracts is to gauge the future inflation rate relative to the current rate. However, the inflation 
outlook implied by CPI futures prices should be viewed cautiously because CPI futures 
contracts are still relatively illiquid and have sizable bid-ask spreads (Guo and Kliesen, 2005). 
New Argentine Bonds Argentina, facing a major economic and financial crisis, defaulted on 
most of its public debt in December 2001. Facing the need to restructure its liabilities in order 
to make the external debt more sustainable and reduce the vulnerability to shocks in future, 
the Argentinian government, possibly on advice from the IMF, decided to offer its 
bondholders to exchange the distressed debt for new bonds linked to the country’s economic 
growth. The financial community, in principle, received the plan well: investors welcomed 
the opportunity to have additional payments during the times of good performance and the 
eventual reduction of the default risk. Some potential issues were pointed out as well, in 
particular the credibility of the data and the proper valuation of the bonds. In addition, some 
expressed concerns over the possibility of moral hazard, i.e. that the country could become 
unambitious about its growth if the threshold (the strike) of the warrant had been set too low 
(Pruitt, 2003). The US$81.8 billion exchange offer to the bondholders was, nevertheless, 
made in autumn 2004. Argentina offered three different types of bonds, clearly targeted to 
different groups of bondholders: Par bonds due 2038, Discount bonds due 2033 (with a 30.1% 
nominal discount), and Quasi-par bonds (with a 66.3% nominal discount) due 2045. All bonds 
are issued in a package with a GDP-linked warrant, but the latter detaches automatically after 
180 days from the date of exchange (April 1st, 2005) and will trade independently. The 
warrants have a maturity of 30 years and an annual payment of 5% of ‘excess GDP’, defined 
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as the difference of the real GDP of the reference year published by the Argentinian National 
Statistics Institute (INDEC) and the ‘base case’ GDP defined in the exchange offer (see Fig. 
2.7). The conditions for the payment are the following: (1) the actual real GDP exceeds the 
base case GDP, (2) the actual real GDP growth exceeds the base case GDP growth, and (3) 
the payment cap of the GDP-linked security, equal to 0.48 per unit of currency during the life 
of the warrant, is not exceeded. It is worth noting that the warrant payments have a one-year 
lag, i.e. the payment for the 2005 reference year will be executed, if conditions are met, only 
on December 31, 2006. 
 
Figure 2.7 Base case GDP growth for Argentina’s warrants 
Source: Oferta de Canje (Exchange offer presentation), República Argentina, 12/01/2005, available at 
http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/ing_presen.htm. 
According to press reports, many bondholders, especially retail creditor groups, regarded the 
terms of the exchange as less than adequate. Possible reasons for the investors’ concerns 
seemed to be related not to the structure of the new bonds, but rather the conditions of the 
offer, such as low interest rates, long maturities, as well as disregard of the unpaid interest for 
the period 2002-2003. In total, analysts estimated that the overall loss to investors might be as 
high as 70%33. It is also conceivable, nevertheless, that certain design features of the new 
bonds, including the complexity of the payoffs and an interest payment cap, could have 
                                                 
33 As reported by Reuters (Milliken, 2005). It is worth noting, however, that during 2003-2004 Argentine 
defaulted debt traded on the market at around 30 cents on the dollar, suggesting that the offer was, in fact, made 
at the equilibrium value of the Argentine debt (Roubini, N. “The Successful End of the Argentine Debt 
Restructuring Saga...”, http://www.roubiniglobal.com, 02/03/2005) 
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contributed to the discontent of the bondholders. Despite the concerns, however, the exchange 
offer was accepted by 76% of the holders of Argentine debt (Milliken, 2005). It remains to be 
seen how the warrant issued under the terms of this exchange offer performs, but this case 
certainly marks an important milestone in the history of macroeconomic derivatives, even if 
only due to the size of the issue. 
House Price Warrants In May 2003 Goldman Sachs started offering warrants and 
certificates34 on both UK home prices and Greater London home prices, with an expiration 
date in 2004. These securities were cash settled based on the Halifax House Price Indices. The 
warrants were rather attractive to investors, since they were deep-in-the-money and had 
relatively limited downside risk (Smith, 2003). In August 2004 Goldman Sachs issued a new 
range of warrants and certificates linked to one specific future level of the Halifax All Houses, 
All Buyers, Standardized Average House Price index (seasonally adjusted) in the UK for June 
2006. The new issue is currently traded on LSE. The warrants provide investors with a 
flexible means of gaining exposure to UK residential property prices. Similar to CFDs, 
warrants and certificates offer some advantages over purchasing the physical asset directly: 
short and long exposure (both puts and calls are available), exemption from Stamp Duty, low 
transaction costs, diversification, and low absolute size of a single security. 
Online Platforms  The development and spread of information technology opened new 
opportunities for developing retail financial markets, including those for derivatives. One 
such Internet-based exchange, HedgeStreet, has been opened in October 2004. HedgeStreet 
offers contracts of a proprietary type, dubbed ‘Hedgelets’, which allow investors to take 
positions on a future outcome of a particular economic variable. An individual contract 
represents a position, either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, on whether a specific outcome will or will not 
happen. The contracts are in effect binary call and put options and ranges that pay a fixed 
amount ($10) if the option expires in-the-money and zero otherwise. For example, a ‘Gasoline 
> $2.125 Yes’ contract would pay $10 if he price of gasoline is greater than $2.125 on the 
                                                 
34 Warrants and certificates are derivative securities that are listed and traded on the London Stock Exchange. A 
warrant is much like an option, for which an investor pays a fraction of the price of the underlying asset (as a 
premium). Certificates are similar to warrants, except that they are unleveraged and, as such, track the 
underlying asset directly (i.e. they are call warrants with a strike price of zero). Investors can only buy warrants 
and certificates, and hence can never lose more than their initial investment. 
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expiration date. The contracts can also be bought or sold among trading members at market 
prices before expiration. Obviously, the price of a single contract cannot be higher than $10, 
which makes the market accessible to retail investors. The exchange does not allow margin 
trading, so the gains and losses of the participants are limited. 
Hedgelets are issued and redeemed in pairs (digital call and put), representing all possible 
mutually exclusive movements in the underlying index for the pair. The pair, hence, bears no 
risk and has a value of $10. After the pair is issued, the contracts constituting the pair can be 
traded separately. Any two contract that form a pair can be automatically redeemed by the 
exchange.35 Like a regular exchange, HedgeStreet only facilitates trades and does not take 
positions on its own account, remaining completely risk-neutral. Participants always trade 
among themselves in a zero sum market. The exchange also recruits market makers among its 
members, so that they maintain a two-sided quote at a predefined spread for specified 
instruments. 
Currently, HedgeStreet offers contracts on indices in five sectors: 
· Finance (currencies, commodities, and interest rates); 
· Economics (inflation and economic activity); 
· Real estate (mortgage rates and residential property); 
· Goods and services (energy); 
· Income (employment). 
The residential property contracts include several options on quarterly changes in U.S. 
regional house prices, settled according to House Price Indices published by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (US Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
The economic and employment data contracts include options on CPI-U, Retail Sales (excl. 
autos), Non-Farm Payrolls, and Initial Unemployment Claims. 
                                                 
35 The automatic creation and redemption of the pairs resembles that of Shiller-Weiss ‘macro securities’ (cf. 
Shiller 2003, pp. 126-129) 
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HedgeStreet positions its products primarily as hedges. Indeed, options such as those on 
residential property might be appealing in this quality to retail investors, as they could protect 
homeowners from equity losses in the case of falling house price. However, HedgeStreet’s 
instruments are too short-term: a contract on house prices should have maturity of at least 
several years to be effective as a hedge. With short-term contracts the new market is likely to 
be dominated by speculators, if it manages to gain sufficient liquidity at all. Some critics also 
contend that average investors are not sophisticated enough to forecast the direction of the 
indicators on which they take positions (Nasaw and McDonald, 2004). 
Contracts on economic data are also available at an online betting exchange operated by 
Trade Exchange Network, Ireland. The exchange’s websites, TradeSports and Intrade, 
currently offer binary call options on various economic numbers, including US consumer 
confidence figures, ISM Manufacturing, Producers Price Index, CPI, Durable Goods Orders, 
Initial Unemployment Claims, GDP, and Existing Home Sales. Contracts have a fixed payout 
of $10 and typical maturities of 7-10 days.36 TradeSports/Intrade operates as an exchange that 
facilitates trading by matching orders from its members and fulfils a clearing function, but 
does not enter into the trades. TradeSports/Intrade enters agreements with independent market 
makers to post the initial offers. For the moment, however, trading volumes of 
macroeconomic contracts remain low relative to other financial index contracts traded on the 
exchange. 
Clearly, TradeSports/Intrade’s contracts are intended mostly for speculators, since it is 
primarily a betting exchange. However, the conditions offered to the investor and instruments 
themselves are not very different from those of HedgeStreet, and they potentially can be used 
for hedging as well. In any case, both examples demonstrate that trading macroeconomic 
derivatives, for all purposes, can be made available to retail investors and that the interest in 
such products might be growing. 
                                                 
36 It is worth noting that although the contracts have longer maturity than most Economic Derivatives, the 
volume in TradeSports/Intrade’s macroeconomic contracts typically starts to build up only closer to the date of 
settlement. 
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2.4 Intermediate conclusions 
The analysis in this chapter shows that macroeconomic derivatives have unique features and 
the potential to be beneficially employed in a number of practical applications. Theoretical 
considerations do support their usefulness, and their history demonstrates an interest in such 
instruments among market participants. It is also acknowledged that the introduction of 
macroeconomic derivatives faces a number of practical challenges. These obstacles, however, 
do not seem insurmountable. In fact, macroeconomic derivatives have already started to gain 
acceptance on the market. 
As section 2.3 shows, macroeconomic securities are being created in a number ways. Of 
these, the OTC auctions and GDP-linked sovereign bond issuance are, probably, the most 
promising ones. The Economic Derivatives market already has a good track record and the 
potential to grow in terms of liquidity, the variety and maturity of the instruments offered. 
The issuance of the GDP-linked debt has the potential to create, in turn, an international 
market for long-term warrants on GDP. Both developments suggest exploring the numerous 
practical applications of macroeconomic derivatives in general and GDP derivatives in 
particular. 
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3. An application for GDP derivatives 
This chapter focuses on the case of (embedded) derivatives, which have economic growth, 
measured as the rate of change in GDP, as their underlying. Specifically, the following 
sections provide a discussion of the merits of using GDP derivatives in conjunction with 
sovereign debt securities, as well as present some quantitative evaluation of this application. 
3.1 The case for GDP-linked bonds 
This section builds the case in support for GDP-linked bonds by describing the way they work 
and discussing the benefits they might provide to the issuers, examines major problems 
associated with the GDP-linked bonds and offers some solutions. Before proceeding to a 
description of the specific structure of GDP-linked securities, however, it is useful to review 
the literature related to the case. 
3.1.1 Literature review 
Indexing sovereign bonds to some macroeconomic variable is not entirely a new idea. A first 
wave of interest in indexing debt to GDP, exports or key commodity prices in academic 
circles emerged due to the debt crisis of the 1980s. At the center of the discussion were the 
relative merits of indexing sovereign bonds to variables beyond the issuer’s control (such as 
commodity prices) versus variables partially under the issuer’s control (exports or GDP). At 
the time, the majority emphasized the problems of indexing debt to macroeconomic variables 
rather than the insurance benefits that such indexing could provide to the issuers. Moreover, 
the decline in commodity prices was considered as one of the major causes of the 80’s debt 
crisis, and commodities accounted for a significant share of output and exports for some of 
the countries most affected by the crisis. In the light of these considerations, indexing 
sovereign debt to commodity prices appeared to be a better idea (Borensztein and Mauro, 
2004). 
During the 1990s GDP-indexed bonds received some more theoretical and practical support. 
Barro (1995) studied dynamical optimal taxation in an equilibrium model that yielded a form 
of tax smoothing as a basis for debt management. The key recommendation of his paper was 
that public debt should be indexed to the price level and have long-term maturity. 
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Additionally, a full program of optimal taxation, according to Barro, would call for indexing 
debt payments to the tax base (aggregate consumption in his model) and the level of 
government spending. However, he acknowledged that GDP might be easier to define and 
measure than aggregate consumption and suggested that GDP-linked bonds – or securities 
similar to those proposed by Shiller (1993) – would be a more realistic alternative. In practice, 
the introduction of GDP-indexed bonds was proposed by some investment banks in Sweden 
in the mid-1990s. The idea received some support from the government, but was never 
realized, partly because the National Debt Office at the time was focused on promoting 
greater use of inflation-indexed bonds (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). For emerging market 
economies, the case for contingent debt contracts came again into the light after the financial 
and debt crises of the 1990s. As shown in Chapter 2, GDP-linked bonds were issued at that 
time by Costa Rica, Bosnia and Herzogovina, and Bulgaria. 
The discussion of the merits of indexing sovereign debt to some macroeconomic variables has 
been revived more recently, and the recent Argentina’s exchange of its defaulted debt into 
new GDP-linked securities has also added a major practical dimension to the discussion. 
Several researchers recommended that countries issued bonds with contingencies to 
commodity prices or other external variables of relevance to them. Drèze (2000a and 2000b), 
basing on the theory of efficient risk-sharing, proposed that countries should issue perpetual 
bonds with annual dividends proportional to the country’s national income and then exchange 
the bonds among themselves to share the risks. In particular, he suggested restructuring the 
debt of poor countries in the form of bonds indexed to the country’s national income net of a 
deductible. The deductible in his proposal was designed to exempt individual incomes below 
a subsistence level from contributing to debt service and to allocate some government revenue 
for meeting basic human needs before servicing the debt. Drèze, however, argued that GDP-
indexed bonds should not be exchange-traded, since market prices of the assets indexed to a 
country’s national income might be interpreted by voters as a measure of a government’s 
performance and the excess volatility of financial markets could introduce noise in policy 
evaluation. 
Borensztein and Mauro of IMF in their two papers (2002 and 2004) put forward a strong case 
for reviving GDP-linked bonds. Their approach is based mostly on the use of bonds with a 
floating rate indexed to the annual GDP growth rate. They showed that such GDP-indexed 
bonds could provide substantial benefits in reducing the likelihood of default crises and allow 
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countries to avoid procyclical fiscal policies. They also considered the issue of an insurance 
premium that a borrower might have to pay for the indexation of its debt, the potential 
obstacles to creating a market for GDP-linked bonds and suggested an approach to attempting 
to start up such market. 
Schröder et al. (2004), in a study commissioned by the German Ministry of Finance, 
examined the applicability of GDP-linked bonds for the financing of developing countries 
based on a quantitative analysis of their pricing behavior, price sensitivities to changes in 
GDP, and their performance in a portfolio context. Their study also considered the possibility 
of adding public guarantees provided by an international organization such as the World Bank 
to partially insure the default risk of the GDP-linked bond. Based on simulations, the paper 
reaches a conclusion that GDP-linked bonds would be, in general, close substitutes to existing 
sovereign bonds. GDP-linked bonds might be chosen by some investors if GDP of the 
borrowing country has a negative or low positive correlation with the GDP of the reference 
region of the investor (or world GDP for well-diversified investors). These results, however, 
depend on a number of questionable assumptions of the study: the authors do not adjust 
default probabilities, interpolate “daily GDP” and use the Black-Scholes model for warrant 
pricing.37 
Kletzer (2004), basing on consumption-smoothing models, found theoretical support for the 
use of derivatives on GDP, commodity prices or other variables in sovereign borrowing. He 
suggested that such contingent debt contracts could bring substantial gains and might be 
useful for eliminating costly bond renegotiation, which is a form of imperfect risk sharing. 
Derivatives associated with sovereign bonds would provide insurance for the debtors and 
reduction of the default and restructuring risk for the bondholders. Also, according to Kletzer, 
debt renegotiation demonstrates that sovereign debt contracts are implicitly state-contingent 
contracts, and this feature provides some sort of international sharing of country-specific risks 
across borders. In this framework, adding derivatives to sovereign bond contracts would 
formalize the implicit contingencies and, thus, reduce the frequency of costly renegotiations 
and, ultimately, raise welfare by increasing risk sharing for public and private borrowers in 
emerging markets. However, Kletzer argues that derivatives should not be embedded into 
bond contracts but issued as separate instruments. This would allow investors with different 
                                                 
37 The potential inappropriateness of these methods will be addressed below. 
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monitoring capacities, risk attitudes and needs to choose between low-risk bonds and risky 
derivatives. Ultimately, if markets in such securities are created, they could reduce 
macroeconomic volatility in debtor countries and increase capital flows to developing 
economies. 
3.1.2 How GDP-linked bonds work 
GDP-linked bonds in general work as follows. In a hypothetical case, a country, whose real 
GDP has been growing at an average rate of 3%, might have been issuing sovereign bonds at 
an average interest rate of 7%. The country could, then, consider issuing GDP-linked bonds 
whose yearly or quarterly coupon payments will be increased by, for example, one percentage 
point for every percentage point by which real GDP growth exceeds the 3% trend. In those 
years when growth turns out to be lower than the threshold, the coupon will be, for example, 
6%, and in years when growth turns out to be higher, the coupon will be increased 
proportionally. Thus, when GDP growth falls, the country will make only debt payments at a 
minimum 6% level, which is lower than in the absence of indexation. In the opposite 
situation, when GDP growth is higher than the threshold, the country will have higher coupon 
payments than without indexation, which is a benefit to investors. 
Mathematically, the coupon rate of a GDP-linked bond at a coupon payment date t may be 
expressed as 
 ct = r + a max [gt – g*, 0], (3.1) 
where r is the non-conditional interest rate, a is a constant that defines the elasticity of coupon 
payments with respect to changes in economic growth, gt is the actual GDP growth rate at the 
coupon payment date, and g* is the ‘baseline’ growth rate. The baseline growth rate of GDP is 
specified at the time of issuance, similar to the strike price of an option. In the example above, 
thus, 
 ct = 0.06 + max [gt – 0.03, 0]. 
Effectively, the issuing country will be selling a series of independent warrants (call options) 
on GDP to its investors together with a straight bond. The two securities can be, then, sold 
separately by the issuer, or the warrants can be easily stripped on the market. 
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Borensztein and Mauro (2004) propose other forms of debt indexation to GDP as well. For 
instance, a GDP-linked security may be structured as a floating rate bond. The coupon rate of 
such bond would vary depending on the performance of the domestic economy, according to 
the following formula: 
 ct = r + (gt -  g*),  (3.2) 
which is similar to a portfolio of a straight bond and a swap. It is conceivable, however, that 
many institutional investors would be prohibited to hold such instruments due to their 
potentially negative coupons, and thus, the following formula with a zero floor would be more 
feasible: 
 ct = max [r + (gt -  g*), 0].  (3.3) 
In this case, the coupons can also be represented as a series of call options with a negative 
exercise price. However, even this type of indexation may be unacceptable to some investors, 
who prefer, possibly because of the provisions of the funds they manage, a guaranteed 
minimum coupon payment. 
The indexation could also be non-linear, as in the following formula: 
 100/)100;0max( tt grc a+= . (3.4) 
This type of indexation gives a better correlation of coupon payments with growth rates, 
while guaranteeing a minimum coupon payment (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). On the other 
hand, such bonds might be more difficult to market to the investors due to the complexity of 
the securities’ payoffs and, hence, their pricing. 
GDP-linked debt, especially in form (3.2), would ensure that the debt/GDP ratio of the issuing 
country is maintained at sustainable levels and within a narrower range than in the case of 
financing by straight bonds. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the effect of GDP floaters and bonds 
with GDP warrants on the debt/GDP ratio. It is assumed that economic growth develops 
according to two scenarios: ‘rise’ and ‘decline’. The growth rate process is simulated as 
follows: 
 100/002.003.0 e+±= tg t , e ~ N(0,1),  (3.5) 
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where e is a normally distributed random variable. The resulting growth paths are 
demonstrated in Fig. A.1 in Appendix. The debt to GDP ratio is calculated according to the 
following formula: 
 Dt/Yt = (1 + ct – gt)(Dt-1/Yt-1) – st,  (3.6) 
where Dt is government debt, Yt is output, st is the primary surplus as a share of GDP, gt is the 
growth rate, and ct is the interest rate. Parameter values are: st = -0.5%; r = 7% for plain 
vanilla bonds and floaters (type (3.2)) and r = 6% for bonds with warrants (type (3.1)), a = 1, 
g* = 3% for both floaters and bonds with warrants. 
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Figure 3.1 The effect of indexing of sovereign to GDP on the debt to GDP ratio 
Source: Author’s calculations 
3.1.3 Benefits to the issuers 
By limiting the growth of debt/GDP ratios, GDP-linked bonds could provide two key 
advantages to the borrowing countries: (1) lower likelihood of defaults and debt crises and (2) 
lower need to engage in procyclical fiscal policy (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). 
Defaults and debt crises The use of GDP-linked bonds in sovereign borrowing may reduce 
the likelihood of debt crises and defaults, which typically lead to financial sector distress, 
capital flight, job losses, and a downward spiral of further declines in output. There is plenty 
of evidence that the ability of a country to service its sovereign debt depends to a significant 
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degree on its economic growth. Easterly (2001) found that slow growth played an important 
role in many debt crises, including the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the debt 
crisis of the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the 
increase of the public debt burden of industrial countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In a formal 
econometric test he also found that GDP growth interacted with initial debt level was a 
significant variable in explaining the number of external debt reschedulings over 1980-1994, 
and hence concluded that growth is an important determinant of whether a debt crisis 
develops. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), using a sample of 69 countries over 1970-
1998, showed that countries with a larger ratio of external debt to GDP are more likely to 
experience a debt crisis. 
GDP-linked debt would help to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio, and thus reduce the probability 
of debt crises. By keeping the debt/GDP ratio at a sustainable level, the indexation according 
to the floating formula would help to avoid adjustments to the primary balance at a time of 
weak economic performance, which could be costly and politically difficult. The mechanism 
is the following: if the economy experiences a period of weak growth, the debt/GDP ratio 
would increase by a smaller amount with indexed debt than with conventional (plain vanilla) 
bonds. Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect of GDP-linked debt on the debt servicing payments on 
the case of Mexico and Argentina over the period of 1991-2002. It is supposed that since 
1990 half of the total government debt of each country consisted of GDP floaters, with r = 7% 
and baseline growth g* calculated as the average growth rate over the previous 20 years. It is 
further assumed that the composition of debt does not influence any other economic variables. 
For Mexico, the average growth over the 20 years to 1990 amounted to 4.4%, while during 
1991-2002 growth averaged about 3%. As Fig. 3.2 shows, the use of GDP-linked bonds 
would have resulted in significant savings on interest payments, especially during the Tequila 
crisis of 1995 and during a slowdown in 2001-2002. The average coupon rate over 1991-2002 
would have amounted to 5.9%, lower than the expected rate of 7%. In Argentina, the average 
growth during the 20 years to 1990 was 0.9%, while in the following 12 years GDP grew at 
an average rate of 2.3%. With this particular set of parameters Argentina would have obtained 
no net savings from the use of GDP-linked bonds, as the average coupon rate would have 
been 8.8%. The country would have enjoyed interest bill savings in 1995 and during the four 
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years since 1999, while its investors would have obtained additional payments in the other 
years38 (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). 
 
Mexico, 1991-2002 
 
Argentina, 1991-2002 
Figure 3.2 Savings on interest payments over the economic cycle 
Source: Borensztein and Mauro (2004) 
Procyclical fiscal policy During economically weak periods a government may face 
difficulties in borrowing from private sources, which may force it to engage in a procyclical 
                                                 
38 Towards the end of period the interest bill savings would have resulted also from a significant increase in the 
debt to GDP ratio due to the depreciation of the peso. 
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fiscal policy. Similarly, a government may be under pressure to employ such policy when it 
attempts to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio due to some legal or constitutional constraints, 
international agreements, or inability to borrow beyond a certain level. GDP-linked bonds can 
reduce the need for procyclical policies, by acting as an automatic stabilizer. When the 
economic growth is below trend, the government will be able to have a lower primary surplus 
(i.e. higher primary spending and lower taxes) with GDP-linked debt than with conventional 
debt. Conversely, when economic growth is stronger than the baseline growth, the 
government will need to have a higher primary surplus (i.e. lower primary spending and 
higher taxes) to accommodate higher interest payment on public debt. GDP-linked bonds 
would thus smoothen the changes of the primary surplus, taxes, and primary spending over 
the cycle. 
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) estimated the benefits of GDP-linked debt in terms of 
government’s ability to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy through the correlation of the 
primary balance and the real GDP growth rate. They calculated this measure for 20 advanced 
countries and 25 developing countries over the period of 1992-2001, assuming that in 1991 
the entire debt of each country was indexed to GDP. The indexation was computed using the 
floating rate formula, were r was assumed to be equal to the implied interest rate from the 
actual data and the baseline growth taken as average of growth rates during 1980-2001. The 
results demonstrated that the correlation between the primary balance and real GDP growth 
would have been considerably higher for both groups of countries if they had used GDP-
indexed debt (0.64 vs. 0.40 for advanced countries and 0.77 vs. 0.30 for developing 
countries). 
This comparison shows that GDP-linked bonds could be especially beneficial for developing 
countries. In fact, these countries often suffer from declines in investor sentiment during 
periods of slower growth. Their governments are often constrained to adhere to a tight fiscal 
policy during economic downturns in order to maintain credibility and access to international 
financial markets, thereby possibly exacerbating the downturn. The phenomenon of 
procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries, which is not limited only to crisis periods, 
was documented by a number of studies. Gavin and Perotti (1997), for example, found that 
fiscal policy in Latin America during 1968-1995 was very procyclical during significant 
underperformance of the economy, especially in respect to public spending. Talvi and Végh 
(2000) argued that procyclical fiscal policy seems to be the norm in the developing world, not 
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just in Latin America. Akitoby et al. (2004) found econometric support for the procyclicality 
of government spending in developing countries, although with varying degree across 
spending categories. A recent systematic study by Kaminsky et al. (2004) also confirmed, 
basing on a sample of 104 countries, that fiscal policy is procyclical in the majority of 
developing countries, especially in the middle-high income group. 
GDP-linked bonds, however, could be also beneficial for certain advanced countries, which 
face constraints on the deficit level. Such constraints can arise because of legal provisions 
(e.g. in some of the states in the US), or from international agreements such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) of the EU. The SGP places an upper limit on the annual fiscal deficit 
equal to 3% of GDP, and some researchers argue that it can force the fiscal policies of the 
participating countries to become procyclical (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). GDP-linked 
bonds can thus be useful to reduce the need to engage in procyclical policy in the EMU 
countries. Some previous papers also provide other justifications for the use of indexed debt. 
Obstfeld and Peri (1998), in the framework of their discussion of the need for fiscal transfers 
within the EU and the dangers of such transfers, suggested that the EU governments issued 
perpetual euro-denominated liabilities indexed to domestic nominal per-capita GDP growth. 
They argued that such debt is more efficient than a fiscal transfer system. In this way, the 
EMU countries would be able to shed some of their macroeconomic risks. Their governments 
would have net cash flows that would increase in case the growth of GDP is unexpectedly 
low, much like in a fiscal transfer system, but without a central bureaucratic apparatus to carry 
out this function. Moreover, each country, they argued, would strive for better performance in 
order to obtain better terms when marketing their GDP-linked securities. Drèze (2000a) 
proposed the use of GDP-linked bonds to share macroeconomic risks among the EMU 
countries on the grounds that such an arrangement is more realistic, as moral hazard and other 
practical concerns are less of a problem for the EMU countries. In fact, many of the potential 
obstacles to the introduction of GDP-linked bonds appear to be less significant in the case of 
the advanced countries.39 The EMU countries, for example, have established and monitored 
common statistical standards. In addition, financial markets in some advanced countries may 
be more favorable to GDP-linked bonds. In Italy, for instance, public pension system is 
indexed to the GDP growth, and private pension funds gauge their performance against the 
                                                 
39 These problems are addressed in more detail in the next subsection. 
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public pension system. Conceivably, these pension funds might be interested in an instrument 
whose return is linked to economic growth. In Sweden, as mentioned earlier, the market 
participants themselves proposed issuing GDP-linked bonds to the government. 
The benefits of issuing GDP-linked bonds for the EMU countries were estimated 
quantitatively by Borensztein and Mauro (2004) as follows. They supposed that two 
countries, France and Spain, were subject to the 3% deficit limit since 1980. In this case the 
limit would have been reached by France in 1986 and 1992-1997 and by Spain in 1981-88 
and in 1990-97. During these periods the two countries would have be constrained to adjust 
their primary balance to meet the ceiling, which would have limited their ability to conduct 
countercyclical fiscal policy (see Fig. 2.3 for France). The correlation between the primary 
balance and real GDP growth during 1980-2002 for France would have been 0.30 with SGP 
(0.55 without) and for Spain 0.25 with SGP (0.50 without). If their debt had been linked to 
debt, the indexation would have offset any impact from the SGP limit: the correlations 
between the primary balance and real GDP growth would have been much closer for the two 
scenarios (France: 0.73 with SGP, 0.76 without; Spain: 0.56 with SGP, 0.68 without). 
 
Figure 3.3 France: Primary balance with and without debt indexation to GDP, 1979–2002 
Source: Borensztein and Mauro (2004) 
Cost of borrowing Borensztein and Mauro (2004) suggest that GDP floaters would provide 
the issuer with an insurance scheme, for which it would have to pay a premium above the 
interest rate that it would ordinarily be charged. Basing on a CAPM-like argument, they also 
show that this premium could be relatively small. However, another approach reveals that the 
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cost of GDP-linked debt may turn out to the advantage of the borrowing country, rather than 
to its disadvantage. As shown in 3.1.2, GDP floaters may be represented as a combination of a 
straight bond and a swap (types (3.2) and (3.3)). Let us consider the straight bond first. Bond 
yields consist of two components; (1) the yield on a similar risk-free issue and (2) a premium 
(spread) above the yield on the risk-free issue in compensation for the risk associated with the 
bond. Since GDP-linked debt would reduce the probability of default, it should also have a 
lower credit spread and lower yields relative to conventional bonds. The other variant of the 
GDP-linked bond, a combination of a straight bond and a GDP warrant (type (3.1)), would 
also command lower yield on its straight component.40 Moreover, it can be shown that in 
order to provide the benefit of reducing default probability the fixed rate of such bond must be 
lower than for conventional bonds or even GDP floaters. Otherwise, if growth declines, the 
bond with a GDP-warrant would have the same effect on debt-to-GDP ratio as a conventional 
bond. The demonstration of the effects on debt/GDP ratio on Figure 3.1, in fact, uses a lower 
fixed rate for bonds with GDP warrants. 
As for the second component, a GDP-floater would have a swap (possibly with a cap on 
floating payments) or, equivalently, a combination of a call and a put option. The swap, if its 
fixed rate were determined correctly, would have zero value at the time of issue and, thus, 
would not require any upfront payment. A bond with a GDP warrant, on the other hand, 
would bring the issuer an upfront premium on top of the sale price of the straight component. 
Certainly, future payoffs would depend on the borrowing country’s growth rates and on 
specific parameters of GDP-linked bonds. However, if the issuer’s economy underperforms, 
GDP-linked debt will not be more costly than plain vanilla debt. 
There are some additional benefits to GDP-linked bonds as well. For example, they may help 
governments to maintain a smooth path of tax rates and essential public services despite 
fluctuations in economic growth, in line with the suggestion by Barro (1995). Borensztein and 
Mauro (2004) also speculate that higher interest payments in years of higher GDP growth 
would make it more difficult for governments to boost thoughtless spending. 
                                                 
40 This argument ignores other factors that may drive up the spreads but are not directly related to the indexation 
feature itself. These factors are identified in subsection 3.2.2. 
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3.1.4 Problems and solutions 
Obviously, GDP-linked securities are not immune to the problems and obstacles that hamper 
the introduction of macroeconomic derivatives (refer to 2.2.2), and may also have some 
unique ones. This subsection discusses several of these issues that may influence the 
effectiveness of the GDP-linked instruments or their feasibility, and suggests some 
counterarguments and solutions. 
· GDP misreporting It is usually believed that governments have substantial control over 
macroeconomic statistics. In many countries statistical agencies are independent, but for 
certain countries such independence may be not absolute. If a large share of a country’s 
external debt is issued in the form of GDP-linked bonds, its government will have a strong 
incentive to influence the statistical agency so that the latter understates GDP and its 
growth rate. Due to the possibility of such misreporting, investors may understandably 
become reluctant to hold GDP-linked bonds. In fact, it may even reinforce the pervasive 
‘home bias’41: international investors may not feel sufficiently well informed about the true 
developments in a foreign economy, compared to the residents of the borrowing country. 
On the other hand, there are forces that can counterbalance the incentive to understate 
GDP. First of all, economic growth is popular with investors and general public, so 
governments may have even stronger incentive to inflate the reported GDP growth rates 
for political reasons, rather than to understate them. Secondly, a country may place its 
reputation, and consequently its access to financial markets, at stake if it misreports the 
GDP growth rates significantly for a long period of time. For GDP-linked bonds with long 
maturities, then, GDP misreporting will be less of a problem. Thirdly, some part of a GDP-
linked issue is likely to be purchased by domestic investors, who could then lobby to 
ensure the accuracy of the underlying macroeconomic data. Finally, if occasional episodes 
of misreporting occur, they would certainly disturb the market, but would not necessarily 
prevent it from functioning further, as already pointed out in 2.1.1. Stock markets, for 
                                                 
41 There is evidence that investors’ portfolios are underdiversified internationally. For example, Golub (1991) 
finds that the ratio of foreign assets to domestic assets (equity and bonds alike) was rather low for OECD 
countries in 1970-1986. Tesar and Werner (1995) arrive to the same conclusion on the data on international 
investment positions of major OECD countries for 1975-1990 (for both stocks and bonds). This phenomenon 
may reflect a widespread ‘home bias’. 
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example, have survived many episodes of misreporting scandals. As long as investors have 
information about potential misreporting, it should be reflected in asset prices and should 
not create a problem for the market. Overall, in fact, private sector sovereign risk 
specialists appear to have a reasonably confident view of the reliability of economic data 
(cf Fridson, 1995). 
In any case, there are several remedies to the problem of potential GDP misreporting. 
Firstly, monitoring on the part of international agencies should help ensure the accuracy of 
countries’ GDP data. The efforts of the IMF to encourage its members to subscribe to the 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) or participate in the General Data 
Dissemination System (GDDS) are especially useful to this end. The SDDS, for instance, 
is designed specifically with attention to the requirements of international capital markets. 
Countries subscribing to the SDDS commit themselves to publish data according to a 
standard format, and to explain their data dissemination practices. If, instead, a country is 
participating in the GDDS, it commits itself to publish its statistical practices, along with 
the plans for improving them. The World Bank Group also provides technical assistance 
and loans for improvement and development of national statistical agencies in emerging 
countries. Secondly, sovereign debt does not have to be linked to a variable under direct 
control of the debtor. It is possible to choose a reference rate for the warrants that is 
published by third party, e.g. an international organization. Alternatively, the warrant may 
include a provision defining its underlying variable as the bigger of two rates – one 
published by the country and the other by a third party. In this way, the country’s 
government will not have an incentive to misreport GDP growth, and at the same time 
there will be no dependence on a third party. 
There is also a case in practice that shows that statistical agencies are able to gain the trust 
of the investor community: CPI-indexed bonds are widely accepted in many countries, 
including developing ones. It can be argued, of course, that it is harder to calculate GDP 
accurately than to measure consumer prices. Nevertheless, the case of CPI-indexed bonds 
demonstrates that the market would not necessarily collapse even when there are problems 
with reported economic data. In Brazil, during a period of high inflation (1970s and early 
1980s), the government modified published inflation indices and bond indexing rules 
several times. The market, however, survived: investors set up an alternative inflation 
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measure that since then has served as the reference index for government inflation-indexed 
securities (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). 
· Moral hazard Another problem, connected to the previous one, is that governments, even 
if they do not unduly influence the reporting of macroeconomic variables, still have 
indirect control over these variables through their policies. The use of GDP-linked debt 
could then give the government an incentive to avoid growth-oriented policies. GDP-
linked bonds would increase payments when GDP growth is above a certain threshold, and 
thus they could reduce the issuer’s incentives to grow. In such case GDP-linked debt 
would rather stimulate inefficiency than bring benefits to the debtor countries. Ultimately, 
however, a country’s growth rate is determined by decisions in private sector, which would 
not restrict its development because of indexation of the public debt to GDP. The moral 
hazard problem, if it occurs, would thus influence the country’s performance only partially 
– through government policies that affect the growth rate, e.g. public investment. Whether 
the use of GDP-linked bonds would make a government to change its attitude towards 
growth-oriented policies is still an open question. It is useful to note, nevertheless, that the 
political argument used for the previous problem applies to the moral hazard issue as well: 
politicians have strong incentive to follow pro-growth policies to become re-elected, to 
gain popularity, etc. Moral hazard can also be avoided through a credible commitment to 
good policies, e.g. in the framework of an IMF-supported program or an international 
agreement that imposes fiscal rules and peer monitoring, such as the SGP of the European 
Union. 
Interestingly, a recent study by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2004), although focused on 
exploring the incentive effects of country insurance schemes such as an expected IMF 
bailout, finds that such schemes, especially when contingent on negative external shocks, 
are more likely to encourage rather than to deter reform efforts in volatile economies 
subject to frequent crises. According to the results of the study, country insurance actually 
reinforces reform incentives, despite the presence of moral hazard, by increasing the 
political returns on the reforms through several channels. The study also finds that the 
mechanism is especially effective in the case of ‘enhancing’ reforms, i.e. reforms that have 
higher payoffs in the absence of crisis, such as growth-oriented long-term policies. Hence, 
to the extent that GDP-linked debt provides insurance benefits to the issuer, these benefits 
may mitigate the problem of moral hazard. 
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· Role of defaults The benefit of reducing the likelihood of defaults has a potential 
shortcoming. The elimination of default costs may remove the main mechanism that is 
acting to prevent the defaults themselves. Dooley (2000) suggests that temporary but 
substantial losses in output, which typically follow after financial crises in developing 
countries, act as an incentive for the repayment of external debt by sovereign borrowers. 
On the other hand, he also acknowledges that default costs have not been completely 
successful in encouraging sovereign debtors to repay. Additionally, these costs may be too 
high and traumatic for the economy to be regarded as a mechanism of ensuring debt 
repayment. Sovereign defaults typically lead to a number of severe and distressing 
consequences for the debtor country, including the loss of access to international capital 
markets, long-term increases in borrowing costs, harmful effects on trade, widespread 
bankruptcies, sharp declines in real wages and job losses, debt overhang, suspension of 
foreign direct investment, and capital flight. A model constructed by Borensztein and 
Mauro (2004) also shows that when GDP-linked debt allows avoiding the inefficiencies 
associated with formal default, the borrowing country obtains additional benefits in terms 
of higher investment. 
· Choice of underlying Since one of the benefits of indexed debt is to maintain debt 
sustainability, an issuer with this objective in mind would choose an underlying variable 
that makes interest payments to adjust to repayment capacity in the best possible way. 
Such variable may as well be the value of the country’s exports, rather than GDP. In fact, 
the value of exports is the ultimate indicator of repayment capacity. As such, it would 
make sense to index debt to exports. This structure has additional benefits: the data on 
exports is more reliable than GDP in many developing countries and, beside this, it can be 
verified on the accounts of the country’s trading partners. On the other hand, international 
trade may be affected by government policies more directly than GDP, so the use of 
export-linked bonds would increase the risk of moral hazard. At the same time, GDP is the 
most comprehensive measure of country performance, which accounts for the contribution 
of exports as well, so it is, on balance, preferable as the reference rate for the indexed debt. 
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Another alternative, applicable mostly to developing countries, is to index sovereign debt 
to commodity prices, as suggested by several researchers and tested in practice.42 This 
method has an advantage, since commodity prices are outside the control of the debtor 
country’s government and are reliably measured. The structure would make sense for small 
countries, where commodity prices determine national incomes to a large extent. The 
revenues of most larger countries, on the other hand, are not dependent on the price of a 
single commodity. In fact, one commodity accounts for more than 25% of exports in only 
6 of 27 developing countries, for which data are available (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004). 
Furthermore, there already exist developed markets for commodity futures and options that 
may be able to cover the hedging needs of investors and exporters. Another argument 
against the use of commodity-linked debt by developing countries is that it would be 
preferable to establish a market for bonds linked to a single type of variable. Such single 
market would be more likely to create a dedicated class of traders and investors, thus 
promoting liquidity, and would permit more efficient international risk sharing. 
· Data revisions Macroeconomic data is often subject to revisions even in advanced 
countries. For GDP, in particular, such revisions may be even larger than for other 
variables such as CPI. The inaccuracies in GDP estimates could be a source of concern for 
investors, but should not represent a big issue. If the bond contracts clearly state the way 
the revisions will be dealt with, investors would not probably be concerned about them at 
all. For example, the terms and comditions may specify that only the final release is taken 
into the account, or establish a certain date of settlement, after which the revisions are to be 
ignored. Over a long period of time (e.g. ten years) the data revisions may actually cancel 
themselves out, reducing the impact of this problem on the overall performance of the 
GDP-linked bonds. Borensztein and Mauro (2004) studied quarterly GDP revisions on the 
case of Argentina during 2Q1999-1Q2003 and found that the revisions were relatively 
small, even though the sample period included times of major uncertainty and a collapse of 
the economy: the largest one amounted 1.2 percentage points while the GDP growth rates 
ranged from –16.3% to 5.4%. Still, from the point of view of the debtor country, it may be 
                                                 
42 Commodity-linked bonds were proposed generally by Kletzer et al. (1992), Haldane (1999), and for the case 
of Chile by Caballero (2002). Several countries, including Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and Uruguay, issued 
commodity-linked bonds in the 1990s. 
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not advantageous to use preliminary GDP data as the underlying variable for GDP-linked 
bonds, since its inaccuracy may reduce the benefits related to the role of indexation as an 
automatic stabilizer. 
· Reporting lag The functioning of the GDP-linked bonds as automatic stabilizers also 
depends on the extent to which the variable part of coupon payments follows the economic 
cycle of the debtor country. GDP data, typically, becomes available with a time lag. Thus, 
the additional payments may fall on a period when the economy has started to decline, 
exacerbating the economic difficulties. While still a possibility, this concern is reduced if 
the bonds are indexed to the quarterly GDP instead of the annual data. The autocorrelation 
of quarterly GDP data is typically high, as recessions and recoveries tend to last at least 
several quarters. At the same time, the data publication lag is not excessively large even in 
developing countries: quarterly GDP becomes available after approximately three months. 
Moreover, GDP-linked debt as an automatic stabilizer would probably be more effective in 
any case than discretionary fiscal policy. Another concern is that the debtor country may 
delay the reporting of the underlying variable in an attempt to avoid or postpone additional 
payments. Such behavior may be prevented in the same way as data misreporting, or by 
establishing a penalty for failing to provide the GDP data in a timely fashion. 
· Complexity and pricing Some investors may be turned away by the complexity of GDP-
linked bonds. Their complexity, however, should not be overestimated. As noted above, 
the structure of these bonds is, in fact, similar to a conventional floating rate bond or a 
bond with an attached warrant, depending on the variant of the indexation formula. 
Indexed bonds are quite common in corporate and government debt markets in both 
advanced and developing countries. The pricing of GDP-linked bonds, however, is an open 
question, considering the nature of their underlying. Still, the absence of a commonly 
accepted, straightforward pricing formula does not preclude the market for such bonds 
from succeeding. In fact, markets for common derivative instruments had developed well 
before modern pricing tools were designed for them. 
· Political incentives An obstacle to adoption of the GDP-linked bonds may emerge also 
from the issuers’ side. Such obstacle is inherent in the system of political decision-making. 
GDP-linked bonds would bring benefits to the debtor country only if they have sufficiently 
long maturity – perhaps, longer than 5 years. The politician’s horizons, however, are 
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typically shorter than that. In case the country is constrained to pay a premium for GDP 
indexation of its debt (e.g. due to limited liquidity), the present government will have to 
commit to paying the premium for the benefit of future governments. From the perspective 
of the public choice theory, the government would have no incentive to do this. On the 
other hand, Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2004), building on their proposition that country 
insurance is actually reform-inducing, argue that a government will always be willing to 
purchase such insurance at a fair premium, since it would increase the government’s utility 
relative to the no-insurance case. 
Additionally, there is an issue related to potential additional payments: it may be difficult 
for the government to justify paying a premium or higher coupon payments in times of 
good performance. This is a similar consideration to the one for the corporate setting, as 
demonstrated by Hull (2003), who provides an imaginary but not unrealistic discussion 
between a corporate treasurer and the president. The only solution to this problem, if it 
arises, seems to be to ensure that the members of the government and the public fully 
understand the hedging mechanism of GDP-linked debt and its benefits. 
· Call features The callability of sovereign bonds is unlikely to be compatible with GDP 
indexation as the call feature effectively denies the investors any upside the indexation 
might provide. If the GDP-linked bonds were callable, it would be reasonable for the issuer 
to call the bonds before the exercise of the warrants (or above-average payments in case of 
the floating formula). The reason for this is that in times of better economic performance of 
the debtor country the yields on its debt would fall, and the country would rather refinance 
itself at the lower interest rates than pay additional coupon payments. Such a scenario is 
easily identifiable, yet it was ignored in the design of the Bulgarian GDP-linked bonds 
described in 3.2.2. The Bulgarian issue had been, in fact, called before any additional 
payments became due. 
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) estimate that at present less than 5% of sovereign bonds are 
callable, so there is no significant obstacle to issuing GDP-linked debt in this sense. On the 
other hand, the call feature is in itself a form of insurance of the issuer against adverse 
changes in the interest rates. In this context, the decision to issue GDP-linked bonds may 
have to be taken in the frame of the trade-off between obtaining protection against changes 
in interest rates and stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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To sum up, issuing GDP-linked bonds appears to be beneficial to sovereign borrowers. While 
it is acknowledged that there are several problems associated with this type of debt, none of 
these obstacles seem insurmountable. This raises the question why these bonds have not 
gained popularity on the market yet. The answer may lie in the barriers to the financial 
innovation in general, as outlined in 2.2.3: it may require some effort for these instruments to 
gain widespread acceptance. The next section attempts to explore why the market would, 
indeed, want to accept GDP-linked bonds. 
3.2 GDP-linked bonds from investor perspective 
3.2.1 Benefits to the investors 
GDP-linked bonds can be viewed not only as an instrument beneficial to sovereign issuers, 
but also more generally as a means of international risk sharing and a way of minimizing the 
risk of disruptions associated with debt crises. Yet in order to succeed in this role, GDP-
linked bonds would have to be accepted by the market. This subsection suggests some of the 
potential benefits of GDP-linked bonds to international investors. 
· Diversification opportunities As GDP growth across the world is far from being perfectly 
correlated, GDP-linked bonds would provide an appealing diversification opportunity. A 
simple exercise on a sample of 15 countries illustrates the point. A correlation matrix of the 
real GDP growth rates over the period 1961-2003 based on the data from the World 
Development Indicators Online reveals that of 105 unique cross-country correlations only 
16 exceed 0.5 (the correlation matrix is provided in the Appendix, Table A.5). Figure 4.4 
also demonstrates the results on a correlation map, where the variables are rearranged 
according to their similarity. 
Chapter 3 An application for GDP derivatives 3.2 GDP-linked bonds from investor perspective 
 88
 
Figure 3.4 Correlation map of real GDP growth rates for 15 countries over 1972-2003 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/, accessed 04/04/2005; 
author’s calculations. 
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) reach similar conclusions on the data reported by 27 
advanced countries, 39 emerging markets (classified as such according to the IFC 
definition), and 26 relatively large developing countries. They perform regressions of 
individual countries’ real growth rates during 1970-2001 on world GDP growth and find 
that unsystematic variation is far larger than systematic variation. For emerging market 
countries, the average R2 amounts to 0.10, with a minimum of 0.00 (Argentina, Bulgaria, 
and some others) and a maximum of 0.39 (Botswana). For advanced countries, the R2 is 
higher, but only marginally (0.28). If the individual growth rates are regressed on the US 
GDP growth, the coefficients of determination become even smaller (0.03 for emerging 
market countries and 0.14 for advanced countries). For bonds, Solnik et al. (1996) find that 
the correlation of monthly U.S. bond returns with dollar bond returns in Germany, France, 
UK, Switzerland and Japan over December 1959-November 1995 was on average 0.18.43 
As long as the countries’ growth rates are not perfectly correlated and investors desire to 
smooth their consumption over time and across states of nature, they would then appreciate 
                                                 
43 The same study also finds that the correlations between stock and bond markets rises during the periods of 
high volatility. However, even in these periods international correlation remains at levels that still make 
diversification beneficial. 
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the opportunity to invest in assets with returns linked to other countries’ GDP. Ultimately, 
of course, the additional diversification benefits of the GDP-linked bonds, or the warrants 
stripped from them, would be determined by their potential to improve the currently 
available investment opportunity set and by their performance relative to specific 
investors’ portfolios, which can be evaluated, for example, with ‘spanning’ tests or other 
performance measure. 
· Avoidance of losses GDP-linked debt would lower the frequency of debt crises, which 
often lead to costly litigations and renegotiations. The associated costs and losses may be 
significant even to large private financial institutions that supposedly diversify their risks 
well. A default is usually followed by disorderly liquidation of the borrowing country’s 
debt by some investors, which take significant losses on selling the distressed debt. 
However, in some situations even such limited recovery of investment is not possible. For 
example, in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s default in the summer of 1998, the 
obligations of some countries could not be sold at any price for several weeks (Granville, 
2002). Some commentators even argue that after the recent restructuring of the Argentina’s 
debt creditors may expect to lose in general as much as 70% in sovereign debt crises.44 
Moreover, chaotic default processes create considerable uncertainty over the recovery 
values, and risk-averse investors should prefer to receive lower interest payments at times 
of below-average performance, as agreed upon in the bond contract from the outset, rather 
than face an uncertain restructuring process. 
A study of the magnitude of the losses suffered by the private sector was undertaken by 
Klingen et al. (2004). They find that the average return to creditors in emerging debt 
markets during the period of 1970-2000, which included two major sovereign debt crises, 
was about 9% p.a., about the same as the return on a 10-year U.S. government bond over 
the same period. The result also holds case-by-case for most of the largest borrowers. This 
means that the creditors did not earn almost any risk premia ex post, even though they had 
taken on considerably larger expected risks ex ante. Klingen et al. (2004), however, 
contend that creditor banks withstood the 1980s debt crisis reasonably well. Yet if GDP-
                                                 
44 “Argentina sets a dangerous precedent: The IMF should set tough conditions for further lending”, Financial 
Times, 07/03/05. 
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linked bonds were issued instead of conventional bonds, the return on the developing 
countries’ bonds could be closer to fair. 
It is sometimes also argued that the private sector was effectively ‘bailed out’ in a number 
of episodes (e.g. Turkey and some Asian countries) by official lenders through their 
support of the borrowing country, implying that the potential losses of the private sector 
should not be a concern as long as an official bailout is expected. However, the efficiency 
of this solution remains questionable, as it raises the risk of moral hazard on the part of the 
debtors and conflicts with the mandate of the sponsors of bailouts – governments and 
international financial organizations. 
· Opportunities for position taking GDP-linked bonds, or rather, the warrants embedded in 
them, would provide opportunities for taking positions on countries’ future growth 
prospects. Currently, this is only possible to a limited extent through the countries’ stock 
markets. However, empirical studies find that stock market returns are unrelated to GDP 
growth. For example, Dimson et al. (2002) show that the correlation between compounded 
real equity returns and compounded real per capita GDP growth for 16 countries is –0.27 
over 1900-2000 and –0.03 over 1951-2000. Similarly, Siegel (1998) finds that during the 
1970-97 period the correlation between stock returns and GDP growth was –0.32 for a 
sample of 17 developed countries and –0.03 for a sample of 18 developing countries. 
These results apply to aggregate stock market returns. Yet, it is conceivable that there 
exists a multifactor model with selected assets’ returns as independent variables that can 
sufficiently explain GDP growth, and hence a portfolio of these assets may be used to take 
positions on the economic growth. However, in many developing countries stock markets 
are not developed enough to offer such opportunities and are often not representative of the 
economy as a whole. Thus, investors would welcome the opportunity to express their 
views on a country’s economic growth prospects offered by GDP-linked bonds. This 
opportunity would be particularly attractive in the case of developing countries, where the 
stock market is not well diversified. 
3.2.2 Opinions of market participants 
After considering the potential benefits of GDP-linked to investors, it is useful to get an idea 
of the attitudes of the market participants to these securities. This subsection reports the 
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results of two surveys of bond market participants conducted by IMF (2004b) and by 
Schröder et al. (2004). 
IMF Survey The IMF survey was distributed among the members of the Emerging Markets 
Traders Association (EMTA) and the Emerging Markets Creditors Association (EMCA), thus 
covering market participants both at the ‘buy side’ (e.g. asset managers and proprietary 
traders) and the ‘sell side’ (e.g. research analysts), as well as ‘cross-over’ investors, who hold 
emerging market bonds only occasionally (according to perceived profit opportunities), and 
dedicated emerging market investors. The survey was focused on GDP-linked bonds, but also 
included questions about potential obstacles to the introduction of the indexed sovereign debt 
in general. Unfortunately, the response rate of the survey was quite low, so the reported 
results may reflect a selection bias in favor of GDP-linked bonds, i.e. they may fail to account 
for the opinions of respondents that generally opposed the idea and, consequently, chose not 
to complete the survey. 
The survey presented a hypothetical case of a developing country, which had been borrowing 
on the international capital market for a number of years. It was assumed that the country did 
not experience any major problems related to external debt, but the country’s bonds, 
nevertheless, traded at substantial spreads above US treasuries. In the example, ‘plain vanilla’ 
ten-year eurobonds (U.S. dollar-denominated) issued by the country had a coupon of 7% and 
traded at a spread of 400 basis points over U.S. Treasuries. It was further assumed that the 
country’s average real GDP growth over the past 15 years amounted to 3% percent, with a 
maximum of 7% and a minimum of –8%. The average growth and volatility of GDP was 
expected to be similar in the next decade. The respondents were asked to indicate a premium, 
which they would require under the above conditions for holding GDP-linked securities rather 
than plain vanilla bonds with the same expected coupon payment. Two types of the GDP-
linked bonds were considered: GDP floaters (type 3.2)) and bonds with embedded GDP 
warrants (type (3.1)). The suggested formulas for coupon payments were, respectively: 
 ct = 7% + max [gt -  3%, 0], and  (3.7) 
 ct = max [3.5% + gt, 3.5%].  (3.8) 
The breakdown of the answers is demonstrated on Figure 3.5. Panel (a) shows that in the case 
of bonds (3.8) the median premium over plain vanilla bonds was between 100 and 200 basis 
points. Across investor classes, somewhat higher premia, on average, was indicated by buy-
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side respondents and ‘dedicated’ emerging market investors, as compared to sell-side 
respondents and ‘cross-over’ investors, respectively. Type (3.7) bonds, on the other hand, 
ensured a minimum positive coupon payment regardless of the economic performance of the 
borrowing country, and the survey revealed that a lower premium might be required for 
holding such bonds (panel (b)). The mean premium for bonds with GDP warrants was 
approximately 100 basis points. 
  
(a) GDP floaters (b) Bonds with GDP warrants 
Figure 3.5 Premium over plain vanilla bonds, basis points 
Source: IMF (2004b). 
The survey also attempted to identify some of the determinants of the premia that investors 
would require for holding GDP-linked bonds and to measure the relative importance of a 
number of obstacles to the introduction of such bonds. The results indicate that there are 
several factors that could reduce the premia required by the investors in the above scenario: 
(1) issuance of a large volume (>50%) of GDP-linked bonds in the context of a negotiated 
restructuring of the country’s debt, (2) issuance of GDP-linked bonds by at least five other 
countries, and (3) evidence of reliability of GDP data reported by the issuers and its 
monitoring by an international organization. Correspondingly, the uncertainty about the 
integrity of the economic data reported by the borrower was reported to be the most important 
concern that made the investors reluctant to hold GDP-linked securities. Other important 
issues identified were the uncertainty about the future liquidity of GDP-linked bonds and (to a 
lesser extent) the complexity of their pricing. Understandably, these concerns were more 
important for cross-over investors than to dedicated emerging market investors. 
ZEW Survey The second survey was conducted by researchers of the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) and consisted of 21 interviews with potential investors in GDP-
linked bonds and financial experts. Respondents represented private and government banks, 
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investment firms, insurance companies, rating agencies, and tax advisors. The survey covered 
the following topics: potential users of GDP-linked bonds issued by developing countries, the 
structure and features of the securities, potential issuers and the development of the secondary 
market. The main results by topic are reported in more detail below. 
· Potential investors According to the survey results, GDP-linked bonds would be most 
suitable for institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, bond funds 
and hedge funds. The interviewees generally agreed that institutional investors would be 
able to price GDP-linked debt. It was noted that GDP-linked bonds were not likely to 
constitute a large part of the portfolio of institutional investors, but rather used for 
diversification purposes. The most interest in these securities would probably come from 
hedge funds and emerging bond funds, whose policies and charters allow such investment. 
These funds might be interested in building short-term or long-term strategic exposures to 
developing countries through GDP-linked bonds. Life-insurance companies and pension 
funds, which typically have long investment horizons, might be interested in buying GDP-
linked bonds and holding them over the long term in order to hedge the business cycle risk 
or participate in the growth of rapidly expanding economies. However, there are some 
criteria that GDP-linked securities have to meet before they are accepted by certain groups 
of institutional investors. Those funds and firms that focus on advanced market and 
generally prefer investment-grade securities, might want to purchase some GDP-linked 
bonds for diversification, but only if these bonds are guaranteed by a trustworthy third 
party. For example, German life-insurance companies and pension funds could only invest 
in GDP-linked bonds if they were rated at least at investment grade-level. Some funds may 
face other restrictions, e.g. they may be required to invest only in instruments with non-
negative coupon payments and redemption at par value. 
As to private investors, the survey suggests that they are unlikely to invest in GDP-linked 
bonds directly due to their complexity and difficulties in pricing. In addition, in some 
countries private investors would suffer from unfavorable tax treatment of innovative 
financial products. For these products, both coupon payments and capital gains may be 
taxed, in contrast to straight bonds, which may be subject only to interest taxation when 
held over a sufficiently long period. Interestingly, the survey speculates that GDP-linked 
bonds may enjoy demand from investors in Islamic countries. In these countries, charging 
interest on lending money is typically prohibited, but additional payments of GDP-linked 
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bonds may overcome this restriction, since these payments would be linked to an operating 
activity, which is allowed in Islamic finance. The interviews also identified that domestic 
investors of the issuing countries represent a substantial source of demand for GDP-linked 
bonds. 
Finally, it was suggested that proprietary trading desks at private banks would not be 
interested in GDP-linked bonds, as they expect their liquidity to be limited. Credit 
departments, on the other hand, would prefer loan payments to be linked to a specific 
project performance rather than country performance. 
· Bond structure The survey contained questions aimed at identifying those features of GDP-
linked bonds that would enhance their marketability, but at the same would not 
unnecessarily complicate the structure of the instrument. The interviews showed that 
simplicity is crucial for the success of these instruments. The respondents suggested that 
GDP-linked bonds should be technically similar to inflation-indexation securities, since the 
latter are already familiar to the market participants. As for the choice of the underlying 
variable, the respondents expressed a clear preference for linking the bonds to GDP. 
Additionally, nominal GDP was proposed for debt denominated in local currency, and real 
GDP for debt denominated in foreign currencies. Regarding possible floors and caps on 
coupon payments, respondents indicated that a (low) floor would be beneficial for the 
borrowing countries that are in a stage of poor economic performance, since they would be 
able to avoid additional interest payments and collect option premiums. However, from the 
point of view of potential investors, which typically have low risk aversion, coupon floors 
did not look attractive. Caps on interest payments found no support among the 
interviewees. The choice of maturity and currency of denomination in general were not 
considered crucial for the GDP-linked bonds, but the respondents agreed that the bonds’ 
maturity term should cover at least one business cycle (7-10 years). Regarding the question 
whether GDP-linked debt should be (partially) guaranteed by an international organization, 
the survey offers different views. A guarantee might be preferable for some investors, 
which only invest in instruments rated above certain level, and for issuers that are 
relatively unknown on the international capital markets. On the other hand, a guarantee 
would reduce the expected return of the bonds and make them less appealing for dedicated 
emerging market investors, who are willing to take on more risk. On balance, the survey 
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indicated that a guarantee would be necessary only to the extent it could enhance the 
marketability of the bonds. 
· Issuers and markets The ZEW survey was focused on developing countries as the primary 
group of issuers of GDP-linked debt. Only countries that have high political risks, 
inadequate institutions or social instability were deemed to be not suited for these 
securities. The survey suggested, on the other hand, that countries with marginal access to 
international capital market would especially benefit from issuing GDP-linked bonds, since 
these instruments may attract some groups of investors that are not interested in straight 
bonds issued by the country. A greater access to the capital markets would permit the 
country to build a reputation with investors, and consequently, would open possibilities for 
issuing other types of securities as well. It was also noted that advanced countries could be 
potential issuers of GDP-linked debt as well, but may be discouraged from doing so by the 
higher costs associated with issuing a new financial instrument, relative to offering an 
instrument of a common type. In general, the survey indicated that the minimum size of the 
issue for GDP-linked bonds should be €250 million (preferably €500-1,000 million), which 
may be too large for a single country. If this is the case, the survey suggests that several 
countries might offer GDP-linked bonds in a consortium. On the other hand, a high volume 
is not necessary for certain investor groups, such as insurance companies and pension 
funds. If the issue is targeted at these investors, a low-volume private placement could also 
be an alternative. The survey respondents agreed that external monitoring of the country-
reported GDP data by an international financial institution, e.g. through IMF’s SDDS, 
would be particularly important to increasing the marketability of GDP-linked bonds. 
Finally, it was concluded that extensive marketing, especially if supported by international 
financial organizations, would be essential for the success of these securities. 
3.2.3 Method for quantitative evaluation 
As noted in subsection 3.2.1, in order to evaluate the benefits of GDP-linked bonds from 
investors’ perspective, it is useful to test their performance relative to existing investment 
opportunities. The following part develops a method for such evaluation and reviews the 
model used to price GDP-linked bonds in the analysis. 
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Performance evaluation From a portfolio perspective, an investor with an existing set of 
risky assets would be interested in adding a new risky asset or a new risky portfolio only if the 
new investment opportunities improve the performance, or diversification, of his/her existing 
portfolio. There are several approached to evaluating the diversification benefits. To evaluate 
such benefits, Schröder et al. (2004) used an approach suggested by Elton and Gruber (1991) 
for equity. Their asset selection rule can be generalized as follows: hold an additional set of 
securities N as long as 
 
PN
P
fP
N
fN RRRR
,rss
-
>
-
, (3.9) 
where NR  is the expected return on the new set of securities and Ns  its standard deviation; 
PR  is the expected return on the existing portfolio P and Ps  its standard deviation; PN ,r  is 
the correlation between portfolios N and P, and Rf is the risk-free rate. This rule expresses the 
idea that an investor would be interested to buy into assets that have higher excess return than 
his/her existing portfolio. However, the criteria of higher excess return would be too stringent, 
since the investor bears only a part of the risk of the two portfolios when they are combined. 
Therefore, the formula (3.9) includes the correlation coefficient to adjust the required return 
on the new assets. 
The rule (4.9) is forward-looking and requires estimates of expected returns on the two 
portfolios, their volatilities and correlation, as well as the future risk-free rate. For GDP-
linked bonds it would, hence, involve modeling not only the development of interest rates and 
credit spreads, but also the economic performance of the issuing countries. The performance 
evaluation undertaken on the basis of such forecasts would rely on multiple assumptions, 
which would effectively determine the validity of the results. For the purposes of this paper, it 
may be more appropriate to conduct a backtest by modeling the performance of GDP-linked 
bonds for a sample of countries, as if they existed over the period studied, and comparing it to 
the historical performance of appropriate bond indexes. The backtest according to (3.9) would 
be based on generally available historical data for most of its inputs, except the hypothetical 
realized returns on GDP-linked bonds. At the same time, the results of backtesting are 
generally dependent on the developments in the test period and thus may not provide reliable 
evidence of probable future performance. The hypothetical realized returns for the GDP-
linked bonds that would have been realized over the past periods are also difficult to estimate 
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within this paper, given the limited availability of the data required for the model described 
below. Nevertheless, it is possible to calculate potential yields (IRRs) on GDP-linked bonds 
that a country could issue and compare them to the yields on the existing sovereign bonds of 
the country and thus obtain a sense of how investors might view the new bonds.45 
It is assumed further that the bonds in this analysis are indexed to GDP according to the ‘bond 
plus warrant’ formula (type (3.1) with a = 0), since it appears more feasible than other forms 
and has already been implemented in practice. The price of such bonds is taken as the sum of 
the prices of its components, i.e. the straight bond and a GDP warrant. This allows breaking 
down the pricing of GDP-linked bonds into two separate procedures: straight bond valuation 
and GDP warrant valuation. 
Straight bond valuation The price of the straight (vanilla) component may be calculated 
from the market pricing of the existing sovereign bonds issued by the country. This can be 
conveniently done through a method proposed by Merrick (2004). In his framework, a bond’s 
current value is a probability-weighted sum of three components: coupon flows, principal 
repayment and recovery value. The mathematical expression is as follows: 
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where ct denotes the coupon payment at date t, CT is the principal repayment at maturity date 
T, R is the assumed recovery value paid to the bondholder in the event of a default, ft is the 
present value discount factor for a cash flow at time t, dt is the probability of default during 
the period from t-1 to t, and Pt is the probability of timely payment of the promised cash flow 
at time t. The fixed coupon rate on the hypothetical GDP-linked bonds will be set at a lower 
level than that of the existing bonds of the issuer, in order to make the price of the straight-
bond component consistent with the existing bonds, and 100% principal repayment will be 
assumed. The risk-free discount factors ft for each future horizon can be interpolated from the 
historical US Treasury securities yields y0,t observed at date t = 0, according to the following 
formula: 
                                                 
45 It is acknowledged that the yield-to-maturity can be realized only if the bonds are held to maturity and all 
payments are reinvested at YTM. Clearly, this is not a realistic scenario, however even with this drawback, YTM 
is still a useful measure for comparing expected rates of return on different investments. 
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The final valuation component of the model (3.11) is the payments probability distribution. 
Since a default on a coupon payment leads to the default on all subsequent payments, Pt 
represents the joint probability of no default occurring from issue date to date t. Similarly, dt 
can be expressed by the difference between joint probabilities of no default occurring to dates 
t – 1 and t: 
 dt = Pt – 1 – Pt.  (3.12) 
The payment probabilities are not assumed to be constant in the model, allowing for time-
varying investor perceptions regarding the possibility of default.46 The default rates are 
assumed to have a ‘term structure’, so that the probability of timely payment of a coupon at 
date t is calculated as: 
 tt teP
d-= , (3.13) 
where dt is the date 0 continuously compounded term default probability rate for a date t cash 
payment, defined as: 
 te tt /)1(10
--+= aad . (3.14) 
In the above equation, ccorresponding ‘short-run’ component.47 The three implied model 
parameters R, a0, and a1 for any day (date t = 0) can be estimated by choosing parameter 
values that minimize the sum of squared residuals for the daily cross-section of conventional 
bonds actually issued by the borrowing country, while simultaneously constraining the 
average cross-sectional bond pricing residual (i.e. the difference between the bond’s observed 
market price and the price generated by model (3.11)) to zero. For GDP-linked bonds, a0 
would presumably be lower than for conventional bonds, so it should be adjusted by a factor l, 
defined in percentage terms to a0. This factor will represent the only crucial assumption in the 
                                                 
46 These probabilities are, in fact, adjusted risk-neutral probabilities for risk-averse investors. 
47 This differentiation is very useful, since it distinguishes the default risk from the credit spread risk. If credit 
spreads generally widen (e.g. during a crisis), this will be captured by a positive value of a1, while a0 remains the 
same, reflecting the long-run repayment capacity of the issuer. 
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valuation of the straight component of the GDP-linked bonds; other parameters will be 
effectively taken from the actual market prices. 
GDP warrant valuation The second component of a GDP-linked bond of the type (3.1) is a 
series of warrants with annual real GDP growth (as reported by the borrowing country’s 
statistical agency) as the underlying variable and a strike price that will set in line with the 
historical average GDP growth rate over 15 years, where possible. The GDP warrant presents 
some challenges in its valuation. As already discussed in 2.1.1, the use of standard option 
pricing formulas might be questionable in the case of GDP derivatives. Specifically, the 
Black-Scholes formula will not be used in this analysis for the following reasons: 
· The original derivation of the Black-Scholes formula (Black and Scholes, 1973) uses 
arbitrage arguments, but no arbitrage is possible for the underlying variable of the GDP 
warrant. Even if there exists a portfolio, which is highly correlated with GDP growth (e.g. 
one constructed with a multifactor model), this solution will likely be country-dependent 
and impractical for countries with underdeveloped asset markets. 
· An alternative derivation assumes that individuals’ utility functions exhibit constant 
relative risk aversion and that the payoffs of the underlying assets are jointly lognormally 
distributed with the aggregate consumption (Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). However, 
annual GDP growth rates do not appear to be lognormally distributed. Figure 3.6 
demonstrates the distribution of logarithms of all real GDP growth rates available from the 
World Development Indicators Online (6,973 observations) and the corresponding normal 
distribution, making the difference evident.  
· The underlying variable does not have observed values between the expiration dates of the 
warrants. Although GDP data is usually available on quarterly basis, the quarterly 
estimates do not provide a good measure of the final reported annual growth rate. 
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Figure 3.6 Distribution of log real GDP growth rates 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/, accessed 04/04/2005; 
author’s calculations. 
· The (undiscounted) value of the warrant may not depend directly on time to expiration. 
Rather, its value would depend on information available at each point of time. Certainly, it 
is reasonable to expect that as time of expiration approaches, the amount of information 
related to the outcome of the underlying variable available on the market will increase. 
However, the information typically arrives to the market in a random and discrete manner, 
so market expectations based on the information would also change discretely, and the 
relationship between time-to-expiration and the GDP warrant value may be less stable than 
the one typically produced by the Black-Scholes formula, even when discounting effects 
are excluded. 
In view of the above issues, a different approach will be used to value GDP warrants. As 
noted in 2.3.1, the expected values of the underlying variable on the Economic Derivatives 
auctions are highly correlated with consensus economists’ forecasts (see also tables A.1-A.3 
in Appendix). Although this result is based on a very limited sample (approx. 2 years), it only 
confirms an intuition that the price of a macroeconomic option would depend on the 
prevailing market sentiment regarding the outcome of the underlying variable. If it is the case, 
consensus GDP forecasts could be used to estimate the price of an option or warrant on GDP. 
Such consensus forecasts, based on a poll of private-sector economists, are published on a 
monthly basis (bimonthly for Central and Eastern European countries) by Consensus 
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Economics, Inc. A limitation of the Consensus Forecasts is that they are available only for the 
current and the following years’ GDP growth, so for the warrants that have a longer time-to-
expiration, the GDP growth rate in subsequent years will have to be assumed equal to a long-
term average rate (estimated on the previous period).48 
Certainly, mean GDP growth forecasts published in Consensus Forecasts are insufficient for 
the valuation of GDP warrants – the distribution of the forecasts is also important. However, 
the distribution of consensus forecasts themselves is unsuitable for warrant pricing, since it 
does not reflect the distribution of the GDP growth rates. As shown above, the empirical GDP 
growth rates are not distributed lognormally. Nevertheless, they may be modeled with other 
distributions that provide a closer match to the empirical one. Figure 3.7 provides an example 
of such distribution, whose parameters were approximated by minimizing the sum of squared 
difference between the two probability densities. It is acknowledged that the logistic 
distribution on Fig. 3.7 underestimates the probabilities in the left tail, but this feature should 
not bias the calculations, since GDP warrants are, in nature, call options, so with positive 
strike values only the right part of the distribution will have effect on the warrants’ value. 
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Figure 3.7 Approximation of the distribution of log real GDP growth rates 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/, accessed 04/04/2005; 
author’s calculations. 
                                                 
48 Certain sources do provide GDP forecasts for more than 2 years into the future. However, the purpose of this 
analysis is to determine a ‘fair value’ for GDP-linked bonds, rather than to price them from the point of view of a 
single market participant. Hence, only consensus (i.e. average market) forecasts will be used. 
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The procedure proposed for the purposes of his paper is to use the estimated ‘true’ 
distribution, with the mean equal to the relevant consensus forecast, for calculating the 
expected payoff of a GDP warrant, which can then discounted to obtain the warrants’ value. 
However, directly using the payoffs based on ‘true’ distribution to calculate the expected 
payoff and then discounting it by the risk-free rate (the so called ‘actuarial approach’) would 
be incorrect, since market participants are typically risk averse, and the warrant prices should 
be based on risk-adjusted rather than ‘true’, empirical probabilities. According to Hull (2003, 
p. 678), in such cases it is still possible to use the actuarial approach if the underlying variable 
has no systematic risk. This can hardly be said about GDP growth, so the ‘true’ distribution 
obtained from historical data and economists’ forecasts needs to be converted into a risk-
adjusted distribution. Such conversion may be accomplished with a technique called the 
‘Wang transform’ (Wang, 2002). The formula for the transformation is as follows: 
 ]))(([)( 1* l+FF= - xFxF , (3.15) 
where F(x) is the ‘true’ cumulative distribution function of the security’s payoff, F is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution, and ? is the market price of risk. Alternatively, the 
formula may be adjusted for ‘parameter uncertainty’, i.e. for the ambiguity inherent in the 
estimates of ‘true’ probability distribution, as follows: 
 ]))(([)( 1* l+F= - xFQxF , (3.16) 
where Q is a Student distribution function with k degrees of freedom. The above formula may 
be, indeed, more appropriate for GDP warrants in the present analysis due to the difficulty of 
objectively estimating the ‘true’ underlying probability distribution. 
The ? parameter is usually calculated as follows: 
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where µ and s  are the parameters of the underlying variable and rf  is the risk-free rate. 
Unfortunately, in this form ? cannot be estimated directly, as the underlying variable does not 
represent the price of a traded investment asset. For such cases, Hull (2003) suggests using 
the following equation: 
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where µm is the expected return on a broad market portfolio (index), s m is the volatility of 
return on the index, and ? is instantaneous correlation between the percentage changes in the 
underlying variable and the returns on the index. 49 A weakness of this specification is that it 
may produce biased values of ? due to non-lognormal distribution of the underlying variable, 
although it can still provide an indication of the risk price for the valuation of GDP warrants. 
The Wang transform will thus produce a risk-adjusted cdf F*(x). The expected value based on 
F*(x) will represent a risk-adjusted ‘fair value’ of the security at time T, which can be further 
discounted to time 0 using the risk-free interest rate to give the price of a GDP warrant. As the 
second component in a GDP-linked bond effectively consists of several warrants with 
different maturities, its price will equal the sum of the prices of all the warrants. Adding the 
price of the straight-bond component to this value will give a fair value estimate for the GDP-
linked bond. 
3.2.4 Quantitative results 
This final subsection provides a summary of the results of the calculations according to the 
methodology described above for several countries: Brazil, Russia, and Italy. It is supposed 
that each of these countries has issued debt with a remaining maturity of 15 years and with 
additional GDP-linked payments that are due on 30 April each year if the reported GDP of the 
previous calendar year exceeds a threshold (the strike price of the embedded warrant). The 
market value of this debt is estimated as described in the previous subsection and a yield to 
maturity of GDP-linked bonds is then calculated and compared to yields on the existing 
sovereign bonds of the country. 
Brazil Brazil is one the biggest borrowers among emerging economies and as such represents 
a good case for the analysis in this paper. Table 3.1 summarizes the analysis of the straight 
                                                 
49 The broad market index in this particular case would be better represented by a world bond index, such as the 
Citigroup WGBI World All Maturities. This choice relies on the assumption that the holders of the GDP 
warrants would mostly consist of bond investors, and for the bond market, as Ilmanen (1995) shows, the 
appropriate risk factor is determined by the world excess bond return, rather than world excess stock return. 
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bond component for Brazil (as at 24/05/05). Parameters used are: a0 = 0.1214, a1 = 0.0000, R 
= 76.5054, l = 25%, and a coupon rate on the GDP-linked debt equal to 6.875%. 
Table 3.1 Straight bond component valuation for Brazil 
Bond Market Price Yield Model Value Difference 
US$ 12.75% 15/01/20 131 8.914% 130.14 0.86 
US$ 11% 11/01/12 117.15 7.647% 115.86 1.29 
US$ 7.875% 07/03/15 99.4 7.962% 103.74 -4.34 
US$ 10.25% 17/06/13 114.6 7.776% 114.11 0.49 
US$ 9.25% 22/10/10 109.7 7.057% 108.00 1.70 
Model 6.875% 30/04/15 n/a 6.506% 103.12 n/a 
     
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations. Note: only clean prices are showed. 
The average historical GDP growth rate for Brazil based on WDI Online data (1989-2003) is 
1.9%, and it is used as the strike of the warrant (the same for each year until 2015) and as an 
estimate of the long-term growth rate of the Brazilian economy. The consensus forecast for 
Brazil for the next two years is 3.7% , which gives a warrant value of 11.20% of the bond’s 
nominal value (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 GDP warrant valuation for Brazil 
Parameter Value 
Strike 1.9% (flat) 
Current year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 3.7% 
Next year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 3.7% 
Long-term growth 1.9% 
Lambda 0.19 
Model value 11.20 
  
Source: Datastream, WDI Online, author’s calculations. 
The total value of the GDP-linked bond is 114.32, which implies an expected yield to 
maturity of 6.34%, given the expected cash flows of the straight bond and the attached 
warrant. The yield of the hypothetical Brazilian GDP-linked bond is, thus, significantly below 
the yields on other bonds of the same issuer. This is due in part to decreased default risk of the 
new bonds, which may as well be appealing to certain investors. However, if Brazil were to 
issue a bond similar to the one assumed in this exercise, it might find difficult to do so in 
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practice, since the bond’s low yield would alienate those emerging markets investors that seek 
higher returns on their funds. Therefore, in order to make the issue possible and obtain the 
benefits that GDP-linked debt can provide to the borrower, it might be necessary to offer the 
warrants for free, i.e. as a ‘sweetener’, or offer them separately, so that the two components 
could be distributed among different groups of investors according to their risk appetite. 
Russia Russia is included in this analysis, despite potential data quality issues, since it is the 
most important borrower among the countries with transitional economies. Table 3.3 
summarizes the analysis of the straight bond component for Russia (as at 24/05/05). 
Parameters used are: a0 = 0.0625, a1 = 0.0739, R = 100, l = 25%, and a coupon rate on the 
GDP-linked debt equal to 7.75%. 
Table 3.3 Straight bond component valuation for Russia 
Bond Market Price Yield Model Value Difference 
US$ 11% 24/07/18 145.00 6.003% 145.21 -0.21 
US$ 10% 26/06/07 110.88 4.465% 110.77 0.11 
US$ 8.75% 24/07/05 100.82 3.409% 100.72 0.10 
Model 7.75% 30/04/15 n/a 4.912% 122.61 n/a 
     
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations. Note: only clean prices are showed. 
The historical GDP growth rate data for Russia available through WDI Online (1990-2003) 
gives an average of –1.6%, which clearly cannot be taken as a forward projection of the long-
term growth rate for the country, since this disappointing performance is largely due to the 
transition of the economy to the market system. Hence, an assumed long-term growth rate of 
4.0% is used as a strike price of the warrant. The 2005 and 2006 consensus forecasts are 5.8% 
and 5.5% respectively, which gives a warrant value of 11.29% of the bond’s nominal value 
(see Table 3.4). 
The total value of the GDP-linked bonds is thus 133.90, which implies an expected yield to 
maturity of 4.85%, given the expected cash flows of the straight bond and the attached 
warrant. The yield of the hypothetical Russian GDP-linked bond appears to be broadly 
consistent with the current yield curve on the Russian sovereign bonds, and thus an investor 
that has expectations in line with the market would be indifferent between the two types of 
debt, although he/she might still prefer GDP-linked debt for its (unexpected) upside potential. 
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Table 3.4 GDP warrant valuation for Russia 
Parameter Value 
Strike 4.0% (flat) 
Current year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 5.8% 
Next year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 5.5% 
Long-term growth 4.0% 
Lambda 0.19 
Model value 11.29 
  
Source: Datastream, WDI Online, author’s calculations. 
Italy Italy is an interesting case for this analysis in light of the benefits that GDP-linked debt 
can potentially provide to the EU countries, as discussed in 3.1.3. The country is, in fact, one 
of the largest borrowers of the SGP economies, and it has been suggested that its financial 
markets might be more receptive to GDP-linked bonds. Table 3.5 summarizes the analysis of 
the straight bond component for Italy (as at 24/05/05). Parameters used are: a0 = 0.0645, a1 = 
0.0000, R = 100, l = 25%, and a coupon rate on the GDP-linked debt equal to 5.00%. 
Table 3.5 Straight bond component valuation for Italy 
Bond Market Price Yield Model Value Difference 
US$ 4.375% 25/10/06 100.86 3.740% 101.00 -0.14 
US$ 5.625% 15/06/12 108.25 4.258% 108.39 -0.14 
US$ 6% 22/02/11 109.21 4.176% 108.89 0.32 
US$ 5.25% 05/04/06 101.37 3.606% 101.42 -0.05 
Model 5.00% 30/04/15 n/a 4.273% 106.17 n/a 
     
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations. Note: only clean prices are showed. 
The average historical GDP growth rate for Italy is estimated on the WDI Online data (1989-
2003) at 1.6% and used as the strike of the warrant (the same for each year until 2015) and as 
an estimate of the long-term growth rate of the Italian economy. The 2005 and 2006 
consensus forecasts for Italian GDP growth are 0.9% and 1.6% respectively, which gives a 
warrant value of 9.31% of the bond’s nominal value (see Table 3.6). 
The total value of the GDP-linked bonds is 115.48, which implies an expected yield to 
maturity of 4.25%, given the expected cash flows of the straight bond and the attached 
warrant. The yield of the hypothetical Italian GDP-linked bond appears to be largely 
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consistent with the current yield curve on the country’s sovereign bonds, as in the previous 
case, and thus an investor that has expectations in line with the market would be indifferent 
between the two types of debt, although he/she might still prefer GDP-linked debt for its 
(unexpected) upside potential. 
Table 3.6 GDP warrant valuation for Italy 
Parameter Value 
Strike 1.6% (flat) 
Current year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 0.9% 
Next year forecasted GDP growth 
(consensus) 1.6% 
Long-term growth 1.6% 
Lambda 0.19 
Model value 9.31 
  
Source: Datastream, WDI Online, author’s calculations. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Summary and conclusions 
This master’s thesis has presented macroeconomic derivatives as financial contracts with 
distinctive features and promising applications. These instruments are derivatives linked to a 
macroeconomic indicator, whose value defines the payoff of the derivative at expiration. 
Macroeconomic derivatives may be constructed on the basis of common derivative securities 
or embedded in other instruments. Their underlyings, however, have particular features: 
macroeconomic indicators cannot be traded, do not allow arbitrage, are reported in a discrete 
manner, and are ‘flow’ variables, representing the development of an economic phenomena 
over past periods of time. Additionally, there are other problems associated with 
macroeconomic derivatives, e.g. measurement biases and the possibility of misreporting. Due 
to these peculiarities, the prices of macroeconomic derivatives may behave differently from 
those of conventional derivatives. For macroeconomic options, this makes the use of standard 
pricing formulas questionable. 
Macroeconomic derivatives appear to have a significant potential. In a wider theoretical 
perspective, they may help improve risk-sharing in single economies, as well as 
internationally. In more immediate practice, they can be used for risk management by 
investors, corporations (under certain conditions), financial institutions, and, ultimately, 
benefit individuals as well. Additionally, developed markets for macroeconomic derivatives 
would provide important information for the market at large. 
Attempts to implement features similar to those of macroeconomic derivatives in earlier 
markets were initially unsuccessful. The failures include inflation-linked futures at CSCE in 
New York, in Brazil and in Chicago, and real estate futures at London Fox. Subsequent 
related innovations, such as Costa-Rican and Bulgarian GDP-linked bonds, the Michelin 
credit facility, New Singapore Shares, and contracts on house prices offered by London 
betting companies, enjoyed more success, but fell short of developing into full-scale markets 
for macroeconomic derivatives. The major practical obstacles that plagued these earlier 
attempts appear to be related to a number of issues, including liquidity, measurement and 
misrepresentation concerns, product uncertainty, reluctance of market makers, coordination 
problems, and institutional rigidity. These obstacles were subsequently overcome to a large 
extent in the Economic Derivatives auctions launched by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank 
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in 2002. The auctions offer short-term derivatives on several macroeconomic indicators, 
including US GDP growth, and are based on an innovative technology that applies the 
principles of parimutuel betting systems to financial instruments and provides a solution to 
some of the most important problems mentioned above, especially the one of creating 
sufficient liquidity. Other notable recent developments in the field macroeconomic derivatives 
include inflation futures at CME, new Argentina’s bonds linked to the country’s GDP growth, 
house price warrants offered by Goldman Sachs in London, and online retail derivative 
exchanges. 
These initiatives demonstrated, indeed, that macroeconomic derivatives are viable instruments 
and can deliver their benefits in practice. One of the immediate applications of these 
derivatives is in the sovereign debt market, where they can offer significant advantages to the 
borrowers and opportunities to investors. Sovereign bonds can be linked to GDP growth of 
the issuing countries, creating a combination of a straight bond and a macroeconomic 
derivative. Such combination has two key advantages: (1) it can lower the likelihood of 
defaults and debt crises, and (2) help issuers to avoid procyclical fiscal policies. GDP-linked 
bonds are most beneficial for developing countries, but may also provide benefits to certain 
developed countries as well. To investors, GDP-linked bonds offer opportunities for 
diversification and position taking, especially when the derivative components may be 
separated from the bonds. 
GDP-linked debt has several problems associated with it, including GDP misreporting, moral 
hazard, appropriateness of the underlying, data revisions, reporting lags, complexity of the 
instrument, and other issues. These problems do not generally seem unsolvable and should 
not preclude the use of GDP derivatives in the sovereign debt market. Surveys of market 
participants and a quantitative evaluation of the potential yields on GDP-linked bonds, 
however, suggest that investors would not universally accept these instruments. According to 
the pricing model developed in this paper and applied to sample countries (Brazil, Russia, and 
Italy), in certain cases sovereign issuers may not be able to introduce GDP warrants with their 
bonds, unless they offer them for free as ‘sweeteners’ or manage to market them separately to 
an appropriate investor group. Still, in other cases, depending on the parameters of the bonds 
and the warrants, GDP-linked debt may successfully replace plain vanilla sovereign bonds, if 
it promises a yield that is not significantly lower than the yield on comparable existing debt 
securities, as well as potential upside through the payoffs of the GDP warrants. 
Appendix 
Appendix 
Table A.1 Results of the non-farm payrolls auctions, consensus forecasts and actual data releases, in 
thousands jobs 
 
Date Implied market forecast (IMF) 
Median 
economists' 
forecast (CF) 
Actual release, 
unrevised 
04.02.05 192 190 146 
07.01.05 166 175 157 
03.12.04 219 180 112 
05.11.04 167 169 337 
08.10.04 109 144 96 
03.09.04 152 150 144 
06.08.04 238 228 32 
02.07.04 223 248 112 
04.06.04 260 216 248 
07.05.04 194 173 288 
02.04.04 143 103 308 
05.03.04 130 125 21 
06.02.04 171 150 112 
09.01.04 162 130 1 
05.12.03 106 150 57 
07.11.03 88 58 126 
03.10.03 -5 -30 57 
05.09.03 8 12 -93 
31.07.03 17 18 -44 
02.07.03 4 0 -30 
05.06.03 -45 -39 -17 
01.05.03 -119 -53 -48 
03.04.03 -65 -29 -108 
06.03.03 -13 -8 -308 
06.02.03 59 70 143 
 
Notes: 
In months where two consecutive auctions were held on the same release, only the implied market forecast of the latest auction 
is taken into account. Consensus economists’ forecasts are from the Reuters poll. 
Data sources: Reuters News, Goldman Sachs (http://www.gs.com/econderivs/), ICAP (http://www.icapeconderivatives.com), 
Yahoo Briefing Economic Calendar (http://biz.yahoo.com/c/e.html). 
Correlations: 
CF/Actual 0.628 
IMF/Actual 0.664 
CF/IMF 0.967 
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Table A.2 Results of the ISM Manufacturing PMI auctions, consensus forecasts and actual data releases, 
percent change 
 
Month 
Consensus 
economists' 
forecast (CF) 
Implied market 
forecast (IMF) 
Actual release, 
unrevised 
02/05 57.0 56.8 56.4 
01/05 58.2 58.2 58.6 
12/04 56.8 56.9 57.8 
11/04 58.0 58.2 56.8 
10/04 58.3 58.5 58.5 
09/04 60.0 59.4 59.0 
08/04 62.0 61.7 62.0 
07/04 61.0 60.4 61.1 
06/04 62.0 62.1 62.8 
05/04 63.0 62.5 62.4 
04/04 59.5 59.5 62.5 
03/04 61.5 61.1 61.4 
02/04 64.5 64.6 63.6 
01/04 61.6 – 66.2 
12/03 58.1 58.4 62.8 
11/03 55.8 56.2 57.0 
10/03 55.0 53.4 53.7 
09/03 53.5 54.6 54.7 
08/03 52.0 51.8 51.8 
07/03 51.0 51.2 49.8 
06/03 48.5 48.4 49.4 
05/03 47.0 47.0 45.4 
04/03 49.0 48.1 46.2 
 
Notes: 
Consensus economists’ forecasts are from Econoday/Bloomberg/Wrightson-ICAP. 
Data sources: Goldman Sachs (http://www.gs.com/econderivs/), Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/ecalendar/index.html), ICAP (http://www.icapeconderivatives.com). 
Correlations: 
CF/Actual 0.953 
IMF/Actual 0.969 
CF/IMF 0.994 
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Table A.3 Results of the US Retail Sales ex. autos auctions, consensus forecasts and actual data 
releases, percent change 
 
Month 
Consensus 
economists' 
forecast (CF) 
Implied market 
forecast (IMF) 
Actual release, 
unrevised 
02/05 0.5 0.3 0.6 
01/05 0.4 0.3 0.3 
12/04 0.3 0.2 0.5 
11/04 0.5 0.6 0.9 
10/04 0.3 0.3 0.6 
09/04 0.2 0.1 0.2 
08/04 0.4 – 0.2 
07/04 0.2 – -0.2 
06/04 0.5 – 0.7 
05/04 -0.2 – -0.1 
04/04 0.6 – 1.7 
03/04 0.5 – 0.0 
02/04 0.5 0.6 0.9 
01/04 0.4 0.4 0.1 
12/03 0.3 0.3 0.4 
11/03 0.2 0.1 0.2 
10/03 0.4 0.6 0.3 
09/03 0.8 0.8 0.7 
08/03 0.7 0.6 0.8 
07/03 0.3 0.2 0.7 
06/03 0.3 0.2 0.1 
05/03 0.2 -0.1 -0.9 
04/03 0.4 0.4 1.1 
 
Notes: 
Consensus economists’ forecasts are from Econoday/Bloomberg/Wrightson-ICAP. 
Data sources: Goldman Sachs (http://www.gs.com/econderivs/), Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/ecalendar/index.html), ICAP (http://www.icapeconderivatives.com). 
Correlations: 
CF/Actual 0.584 
IMF/Actual 0.681 
CF/IMF 0.899 
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Table A.4 Simulated growth rates for Figure 3.1. 
 Scenario 
Year Growth declines Growth rises 
0 3.0% 3.0% 
1 1.7% 2.9% 
2 0.7% 4.3% 
3 2.5% 4.1% 
4 3.3% 3.0% 
5 2.6% 4.7% 
6 1.2% 3.9% 
7 0.1% 3.1% 
8 1.2% 3.8% 
9 1.8% 5.4% 
10 0.3% 6.8% 
11 0.3% 6.1% 
12 -0.5% 4.7% 
13 0.3% 5.4% 
14 0.9% 6.5% 
15 0.4% 5.4% 
16 0.0% 6.2% 
17 -0.1% 5.8% 
18 0.0% 5.6% 
19 -1.1% 3.1% 
20 -1.9% 6.8% 
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Growth declines
Growth rises
 
Figure A.1 Simulated growth paths for Figure 3.1. 
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Table A.5 Correlation of GDP growth rates of 15 countries over 1961-2003 
 
 Argentina Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany Italy Japan S. Korea Mexico Sweden Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Argentina 1.00               
Australia -0.03 1.00              
Brazil 0.22 0.16 1.00             
Canada -0.07 0.66 0.50 1.00            
China 0.10 0.12 -0.24 -0.05 1.00           
France 0.04 0.35 0.39 0.50 -0.23 1.00          
Germany 0.09 0.02 0.21 0.25 -0.28 0.66 1.00         
Italy 0.05 0.32 0.55 0.51 -0.46 0.78 0.64 1.00        
Japan 0.11 0.40 0.41 0.30 -0.26 0.75 0.59 0.70 1.00       
S. Korea -0.05 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.34 1.00      
Mexico 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.28 -0.11 0.38 0.26 0.34 0.42 -0.16 1.00     
Sweden -0.02 0.40 0.31 0.47 -0.08 0.61 0.13 0.53 0.48 0.08 0.24 1.00    
Turkey 0.05 0.20 0.19 0.19 -0.17 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.11 -0.11 0.43 0.00 1.00   
United Kingdom -0.03 0.45 0.22 0.52 0.12 0.36 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.33 -0.07 0.42 -0.18 1.00  
United States 0.04 0.57 0.12 0.75 0.05 0.34 0.45 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.62 1.00 
 
Notes: 
Countries are selected according to following factors: geographical representation, volume of external debt securities outstanding, and availability of data. 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/, accessed 04/04/2005; author’s calculations. 
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